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PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE COVERAGE: A
GUIDE FOR THE EMPLOYMENT
LAWYER
FRANCIS

J.

MOOTZ*

INTRODUCTION

Employment lawyers have witnessed a virtual revolution in the
law of employment relations during the past thirty years. Although
the federal government intervened substantially in private employ
ment relationships in response to the economic catastrophe of the
Great Depression,l employers remained largely free of regulation
until the explosion of statutes and common law developments that
commenced in the 1960s and continues today.2 Recent develop
ments in common law tort and contract principles are particularly
troubling for defense counsel in employment matters, since the re
sulting doctrinal uncertainty renders it difficult to assess the client's
exposure with any assurance until the appeals in the case have been
exhausted.
* © 1995, Francis J. Mootz, III, Professor of Law, Western New England College
School of Law. This article is a revised version of a paper presented on August, 8,1995
at the 1995 Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association in Chicago, Illinois. Pro
fessor Mootz gratefully acknowledges the assistance and insight provided by Larry
Weidemier (Class of '97). Mr. Weidemier formerly served as Manager, Commercial
Lines Underwriting Training, at Hanover Insurance Company, Worcester,
Massachusetts.
1. See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 151-69 (1988);
Federal Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance Benefits Act (Social Security
Act) of 1935, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 401-33 (1988); and Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29
U.S.C.A. §§ 201-19 (1988).
2. Federal statutes affording protections to employees address a wide range of
issues and often are supplemented by state legislation. Much of the legislation defines
the civil rights of applicants and employees. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title
VII), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1988), Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102
106, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 19871, 2000e (1991»; Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 621-34; Americans With Disabili
ties Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-213 (1990). Increasingly, however, legislation regulates
the terms and conditions of employment. See, e.g., Employee Polygraph Protection
Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 2001-09 (1988); Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.c.A.
§§ 2601-54 (1993). Common law. developments include expanded recognition of im
plied-in-fact contracts premised on oral statements or employee handbooks, promissory
estoppel, defamation, and wrongful discharge in contravention of public policy.
5
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Consider the uncomfortable position of the lawyer represent
ing Mobil Coal Producing, Inc. ("MCP"). In 1985, the Wyoming
Supreme Court held that MCP's employee handbook constituted
part of the employment contract between MCP and its workers,
and therefore that the handbook provisions were binding on the
company.3 MCP immediately added a provision to its employee
handbook which expressly disclaimed any intent that the handbook
be contractually binding, and MCP amended the applications
signed by all prospective employees to include a clause acknowl
edging that the employment relationship would be terminable at
the will of either party. An employee hired after MCP began using
these disclaimers later sued MCP for breach of contract for failing
to adhere to the disciplinary procedures outlined in the employee
handbook. MCP obtained summary judgment, but the Wyoming
Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for tria1. 4 The
court initially found that the language of the handbook was suffi
cient to connote a promise giving rise to potential liability under a
theory of promissory estoppel, notwithstanding the legal effective
ness of the disclaimers to negate full contractual obligation. 5 On
rehearing, the court changed tack and held that MCP might be sub
ject to contractual liability because the disclaimers were insuffi
ciently conspicuous to be binding on McDonald.6 Justice Thomas,
dissenting from both majority opinions, expressed his confusion and
concern:
I fear that corporate America, as it lives in the state of Wyoming,
will be forced to conclude that the court is toying with it in some
cruel and peculiar game of cat and mouse. In my judgment, we
offered guidance in the earlier employee at will cases and, now,
when confronted with an employer who followed that advice, we
should not say that we really did not mean to adhere to our ear
lier guidance. 7

This statement most likely captures the sentiment of many defense
lawyers in employment matters.
3. Mobil Coal Producing, Inc. v. Parks, 704 P.2d 7fr2, 706-Q7 (Wyo. 1985).
4. McDonald v. Mobil Coal Producing, Inc., 789 P.2d 866 (Wyo. 1990), reaffd,
820 P.2d 986 (1991).
5. Id. at 869.
6. McDonald, 820 P.2d at 989. Subsequently, the Wyoming Supreme Court reaf
firmed and explained this latter rationale. See Lincoln v. Wackenhut Corp., 867 P.2d
701, 703-04 (Wyo. 1994) (courts will enforce a "conspicuous and unambiguous dis
claimer" in an employee handbook, as measured by the clarity and prominence of the
disclaimer language, as well as the placement of the disclaimer in the handbook).
7. McDonald, 789 P.2d at 872 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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The increasing plasticity of tort and contract doctrines in em
ployment litigation is not an isolated development, but rather is
part of a broader trend that represents the legacy of the Legal Real
ism movement earlier this century. This trend may be summarized
as a rejection of abstract doctrinal formalism in favor of paying
much greater attention to the reasonable expectations of the parties
to the transaction and also to the disparities in their bargaining
power. These same concerns driving current developments in em
ployment law have inspired similar and more longstanding develop
ments in the law governing the relationship between an insurance
carrier and its insured. Ironically, then, an employment lawyer will
find that the doctrinal shifts magnifying her client's exposure to its
employees are paralleled by doctrinal shifts in insurance law that
greatly increase her client's ability to demand coverage under its
insurance contracts for these legal expenses and judgments. Even
the mouse gets to play the cat on occasion.
In this Article, I will discuss basic insurance law principles that
come into play when employers assert that their liability insurance
provides coverage for employment disputes. Although the exam
ples I use to explain these concepts pertain to coverage disputes in
connection with employment litigation, I will focus on the basic
principles and leave the detailed legal analysis of the coverage is
sues to the other participants in the symposium. s
8. Joseph P. Monteleone, Coverage Issues Under Commercial General Liability
and Directors' and Officers' Liability Policies, 18 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 47 (1996);
James E. Scheuermann & John K. Baillie, Employer's Liability and Errors and Omis
sions Insurance Coverage for Employment-Related Claims, 18 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 71
(1996); Larry M. Golub, A Checklist for Insurance Coverage in the Employment Litiga
tion Context, 18 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 99 (1996); Steven R. Gilford & Robert M. Fo
gler, Insurance Coverage Actions: Who, Where, and When to Sue, 18 W. NEW ENG. L.
REv. 123 (1996); Joseph P. Monteleone, Employment Practices Liability Insurance
(EPLI) Policies: Who Controls Selection of Defense Counsel, 18 W. NEW ENG. L. REv.
159 (1996); Wayne E. Borgeest, Anthony J. Fowler, & Michael M. Santocki, Employ
ment Law Claims: Triggering Coverage Under "Claims Made" Policies, 18 W. NEW.
ENG. L. REv. 179 (1996); Calum Anderson, Insurance Coverage for Employment-Re
lated Litigation: Connecticut Law, 18 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 199 (1996); Marylou Fabbo,
Audrey J. Samit, & Richard U. Stubbs, Jr., Insurance Coverage for Employment Claims
in Massachusetts, 18 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 255 (1996).
Previously published articles providing specific legal analysis of insurance coverage
for employment litigation include: WAYNE E. BORGEEST & PATRICK M. KELLY, EM·
PWYMENT LAw LIABILITY CLAIMS: WHAT You NEED TO KNOW ABOUT INSURANCE
COVERAGE (eds., Practicing Law Institute 1995); Irene A. Sullivan & Adam C. Rosen
berg, Insurance Coverage for Wrongful Termination and Employment Discrimination
Claims, in INSURANCE COVERAGE LmGATION: 1994 (Practicing Law Institute); Robert
A. Machson & Joseph P. Monteleone, Insurance Coverage for Wrongful Employment
Practices Claims Under Various Liability Policies, 49 Bus. LAW. 689 (1994); James E.
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At the outset, it is important to emphasize that insurance cov
erage is not and should not be the only technique an employer uses
to manage the risk arising out of employment-related practices. For
several reasons, insurance may not even be the most desirable tech
nique. First, coverage often will be a disputed matter, leading to
uncertainty and perhaps to increased -transaction costs in dealing
with employment claims. Additionally, insurance defense counsel
retained by the insurance carrier may conduct the litigation in a
manner that conflicts with the employer's broader human resources
strategy for dealing with employee grievances. Finally, an insurer's
underwriters may refuse to continue coverage for a reasonable
price if the employer submits an inordinate number of employ
ment-related claims within a particular period.
On the other hand, insurance coverage might afford far more
in terms of risk management than simply defending claims and pay
ing losses. Depending on the importance to the insurer of the em
ployer's account, the employer may be able to secure the insurer's
agreement to establish a loss prevention and claim settlement pro
cedure that would allow the employer to participate actively in risk
management at every stage. Needless to say, the employer's coun
sel should work together with the insurer in this regard; if possible,
the employer might insist that an on-going risk management com
mittee composed of counsel, claims, and loss control personnel
from the insurer and the employer's human resource managers co
ordinate the risk management strategies relating to employment
practices. Such coordination would involve the employer rather
than subjecting it to an insurer that reacts according to its own in
terests when problems arise.
I.

RELEVANT LIABILITY INSURANCE POLICIES

Litigation asserting that the employer's liability insurance pro
vides coverage for employment disputes has become increasingly
common as a result of the tremendous increase in employment liti
gation. It is by no means unusual that employers would seek insur
ance coverage of these claims, given that the "first liability
Scheuermann, Insurance Coverage for Employment-Related Claims, 28 TORT & INS.
L.J. 778 (1993); Kearney W. Kilens, Employer Insurance Coverage for Employment Liti
gation, 79 ILL. BAR J. 32 (1991); David M. Spector & David B. Ritter, Insurance Cover
age of Employee Claims Against Employers, 5 LAB. LAW. 615 (1989); John E. Peer &
Ronald E. Mallen, Insurance Coverage of Employment Discrimination and Wrongful
Termination Actions, (pts. 1 & 2) 54 DEF. CoUNS. J. 464-81 (1987) and 55 DEF. COUNS.
J. 12-25 (1988).
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insurance policies . . . were purchased by employers as protection
against tort liability to employees resulting from work injuries"
prior to the adoption of workers' compensation legislation. 9 De
fense counsel-whether in-house counsel supervising litigation or
outside counsel retained by the employer to defend the suit-play
an important role in assisting clients to identify potential insurance
coverage for employment disputes. It is not possible to examine the
potential for insurance coverage competently without drawing upon
a detailed understanding of substantive employment law and the
specifics of the claims being asserted against the employer. Re
viewing the relevant policies is complicated by the fact that a
number of common liability policies might provide coverage when
an employer faces an employment-related claim.1° In this part of
the Article, I briefly describe the liability policies that potentially
afford coverage for typical employment-related claims.
In order to identify relevant liability insurance policies, em
ployment lawyers must understand the three-dimensional model of
insurance coverage that is operative in many cases. First, the em
ployer's liability insurance program has a "width," defined by the
various policies that provide primary insurance coverage. Second,
the liability program has a "height," defined by the different eco
nomic levels of coverage provided by various insurance products.
Finally, the liability program has a "length," defined by an historical
succession of policies owned by the employer during the time pe
riod implicated by the allegations in the complaint. Only by exam
ining fully the "three dimensions" of the employer's insurance
portfolio can the lawyer ensure that no potential coverage is over
looked. I discuss each of these dimensions in tum.
A.

Primary Liability Coverage: The Width of the Client's
Insurance

The Commercial General Liability ("CGL") Policy provides
basic liability insurance coverage for various business entities and
governmental units. A CGL policy serves as a general-purpose
9. ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW § 4.8(a) (student ed.
1988). See C. ARTHUR WILLIAMS, JR., INSURANCE ARRANGEMENTS UNDER WORKER'S
COMPENSATION 3-4 (1969) (asserting that an 1886 employer's tort liability policy was
the first instance of liability insurance in America).
to. The general problem in the insurance market of the "heavy reliance on so
many different forms of insurance and of the relatively disorganized way in which all
this coverage has come into being" is analyzed by Professor Abraham in KENNETH S.
ABRAHAM, DISTRffiUTING RISK 133-72 (1986).
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foundation for the insured's liability coverage, much as the typical
homeowner's policy provides individuals with their basic liability
coverage. For purposes of employment-related claims, the CGL
policy is fairly described as promising to pay, on behalf of the em
ployer, the liabilities associated with bodily injuries and personal
injuries caused by accidents. Certain risks, such as liability in
curred by a business on account of the negligent operation of its
automobiles, are covered by separate policies premised on different
underwriting and pricing. l l The most important example of a pol
icy that provides additional primary coverage is the Workers' Com
pensation and Employer's Liability Policy, which in fact provides
two distinct types of coverage for an employer's potential liability
to employees.1 2 The workers' compensation coverage under the
policy promises to pay all benefits due from the employer pursuant
to the governing workers' compensation scheme. Workers' com
pensation statutes vary from state to state, sometimes to a signifi
cant degree.13 Generally, these statutory schemes impose no-fault
liability on employers to pay death benefits, medical and rehabilita
tion expenses, and/or lost wages to employees suffering injuries that
arise out of and occur during the course of their employment; in
exchange, the statutes insulate the employer from what would often
11. In the early stages of this project, my research assistant, Larry Weidemier,
suggested that it was only a matter of time before an industrious lawyer sought cover
age for employment-related liabilities under the business auto policy. While updating
my research in January, 1996, I was only mildly surprised to find an example of just such
a claim. See Edquist v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., No. C6-95-1111, 1995 WL 635179
(Minn. App. Oct. 31, 1995) (unpublished opinion) (rejecting the insured's argument
that coverage under its business auto policy was triggered by a claim that its area man
ager sexually assaulted and harassed a female subordinate while in a company car,
given that there was no "occurrence" as required by the policy).
12. As one court recently summarized:
[E]mployers' liability insurance is traditionally written in conjunction with
workers' compensation policies, and is intended to serve as a "gap-filler," pro
viding protection to the employer in those situations where the employee has a
right to bring a tort action despite the provisions of the workers' compensation
statute or the employee is not subject to the workers' compensation law. Gen
erally, these two kinds of coverage are mutually exclusive.
Producers Dairy Delivery Co. v. Sentry Ins., 718 P.2d 920, 927 (Cal. 1986) (citations
omitted). See also Ottumwa Hous. Auth. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 495
N.W.2d 723, 729 (Iowa 1993) ("Employers' liability insurance protects an employer
against common-law liabilities for injuries resulting to employees. In contrast, workers'
compensation insurance protects the employer against liability imposed by the worker's
compensation acts.").
13. Several states still make the workers' compensation scheme elective for both
employer and employee, a carryover from the necessity to avoid constitutional chal
lenge earlier this century. ARTHUR LARSON, WORKMEN'S CoMPENSATION § 5.20 (desk
ed.1988).
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be more expansive tort liability.14 The employer's liability cover
age, in contrast, promises to pay on behalf of employers certain lia
bilities incurred to employees that fall outside the scope of the
workers' compensation statutes. Unless and until Employment-Re
lated Practices Liability endorsements or policies become widely
available to employers, the CGL policy and Workers' Compensa
tion and Employers' Liability Policy will continue to be the most
pertinent primary coverages implicated by employment related
claims.
Another liability policy that may provide coverage for an em
ployment claim is Directors & Officers ("D&O") Liability Insur
ance. In many cases, claims made against a business by a
disgruntled or former employee will also include separate claims
against individual corporate officials. A D&O policy generally in
demnifies a company for any settlements, judgments, and expenses
that it incurs as a result of claims premised on wrongful acts com
mitted by its directors and officers acting in their official capacity.
D&O policies may also insure the directors and officers personally.
Even more specific is Pension and Welfare Fund Fiduciary Liability
Insurance, which insures pension and welfare benefit plans, admin
istrators, and trustees against suits alleging wrongful acts in connec
tion with the operation of such plans. Given the broad preemptive
effect of ERISA,15 many employment-related claims in fact amount
to claimed rights under ERISA.16
14. See, e.g., Suckow v. NEOWA FS, Inc., 445 N.W.2d 776, 779 (Iowa 1989) ("[an]
employer's immunity is the quid pro quo by which the employer gives up his nonnal
defenses and assumes automatic liability, while the employee gives up his right to com
mon law verdicts"). See generally LARSON, supra note 13, at §1.10; Richard A. Epstein,
The Historical Origins and Economic Structure of Workers' Compensation Law, 16 GA.
L. REv. 775, 800-03 (1982) (offering an economic justification of the quid pro quo em
bodied in workers' compensation acts).
15. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1001-1461 (1988). ERISA's broad preemption provision is found at 29 U.S.C. § 1144
(1988).
16. See, e.g., Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133 (1990); Sanson v.
General Motors Corp., 966 F.2d 618, 621 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1578
(1993) (holding that the plaintiff employee's state law claims were preempted by ER
ISA, even though ERISA afforded no relief for the alleged wrongdoing). Because the
remedies afforded by ERISA have been construed very narrowly by the courts, it is
unlikely that a fiduciary responsibility policy will provide coverage in an employment
related claim since the employee often will only be awarded wrongfully withheld bene
fits, which are outside the scope of covered losses. See Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co.
v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985) and its developing progeny. However, if the developing
federal common law cause of action of equitable estoppel survives Supreme Court scru
tiny, it may well be that a suit for promised benefits that admittedly are outside the

12

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18:5

In summary, several policies or endorsements providing pri
mary liability insurance potentially will provide coverage for em
ployment disputes. Counsel assisting an employer to review its
liability coverage must fully review the applicable "width" of the
employer's primary insurance protection.
B. Excess Liability Coverage: The «Height" of the Client's
Insurance
Many businesses purchase one or more levels of coverage to
supplement their primary liability coverages. «Follow Form" Ex
cess Liability Policies generally provide coverage under the same
terms as the primary policy for liability in excess of those policy
limits. Typically, excess policies supplement an underlying primary
program of liability coverage consisting of CGL, Workers' Com
pensation and Employers' Liability, and Business Auto Liability
coverages. In comparison, Umbrella Excess Liability Policies com
bine excess coverage with supplemental coverage intended to fill
certain "gaps" in the primary insurance coverageP Because the
insurance carriers participating in this market have developed their
own policy forms, any umbrella policy must be reviewed carefully,
especially if no potential coverage exists under the employer's pri
mary liability insurance policies. I8
These levels of coverages and their inter-relationship are illus
trated in the following example. Assume that a company has
purchased a CGL policy that includes a $25,000 deductible and a
policy limit of $500,000, excess coverage for liability between
$500,000 and $1 million, and umbrella coverage up to a limit of $10
million. If an employee recovers a $2 million verdict, all of which is
covered under these liability policies, the employer would pay the
$25,000 deductible, the CGL carrier would pay $475,000, the excess
scope of unambiguous plan language will trigger coverage. See, e.g. Black v. TIC Inv.
Corp., 900 F.2d 112, 114-15 (7th Cir. 1990).
17. A court recently described the "unique and special coverage" afforded by an
umbrella policy by noting that "under certain circumstances, the policy acts as primary
insurance, where there is coverage under the [umbrella] policy but not under any other
regular primary policy issued" to the employer. Dixon Distrib. Co. v. Hanover Ins. Co.,
612 N.E.2d 846, 849-50 (III. App. Ct. 1993), affd, 641 N.E.2d 395 (III. 1994).
18. Thus, in a number of cases employers have sought coverage for employment
disputes from the.ir umbrella carrier. See, e.g., ]ostens Inc. v. Northfield Ins. Co., 527
N.W.2d 116 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995), Dixon Distrib. Co. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 641 N.E.2d
395 (Ill. 1994), Teague Motor Co. v. Federated Servo Ins. Co., 869 P.2d 1130 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1994); Clark-Peterson Co. v. Independent Ins. Assoc. Ltd., 492 N.W.2d 675 (Iowa
1992).
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carrier would pay $500,000, and the umbrella carrier would pay $1
million. Because employment claims may result in large verdicts, it
is important to investigate the full "height" of the employer's insur
ance coverage. Moreover, even in the absence of coverage at the
primary level of insurance, in some cases an umbrella policy may
provide coverage for the claim. An umbrella policy providing cov
erage for an event not covered by the underlying primary policies
generally will do so only over a "retained limit," which is equivalent
to a deductible.
C.

Liability Coverage over Time: The "Length" of the Client's
Insurance

Collecting and reviewing the relevant policies that potentially
provide coverage for employment litigation may be further compli
cated if the employee alleges continuing wrongful acts by the em
ployer over a period of several years. Under standard Occurrence
Coverage policies, each and every policy in force at the time of the
alleged wrongful acts by the employer potentially provides cover
age for the claim. Therefore, it is important to identify the time
periods during which the alleged injuries occurred and to review all
liability policies in force during this period, regardless of whether
the policies continue in force at the time that the claim for coverage
is asserted. In response to the long "tail" of liability facing carriers
utilizing occurrence coverage, some insurers recently have begun to
issue liability policies that provide only Claims Made Coverage. 19
In its pure form, the coverage "trigger" for this more restrictive pol
icy is a claim made against the insured during the policy term for an
occurrence taking place during the policy term. Generally, how
ever, coverage is expanded to include claims arising out of occur
rences taking place on or after the "retroactive date" specified in
19. See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 9, at § 5.10(d)(3) (noting that in recent
years "most liability insurers have sought to expand dramatically the use of 'claims
made' policies to liability risks beyond the professional liability areas in which these
coverages came to be used extensively in the 1970s" but also noting the resistance to
this move expected in the market). In fact, CGL "occurrence" policies continue to
dominate the standard market, notwithstanding the availability, since 1985, of an Insur
ance Services Office "claims made" CGL policy. However, specialty products such as
fiduciary insurance for pension plan administrators are more likely to be written on a
"claims made" basis. See, e.g., Gulf Resources & Chern. Corp. v. Gavine, 763 F. Supp.
1073 (D. Idaho 1991). Although Employment Practices Liability Insurance policies are
still relatively new to the market and therefore, still developing in response to consumer
demand, it is apparent that these policies will be written almost exclusively on a "claims
made" basis.
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the policy. Additionally, many policies provide coverage for claims
made during an "extended reporting period," which follows the
normal expiration of the policy.
A simple example illustrates the distinction between Occur
rence and Claims Made coverage. Assume that an employer is sued
in 1994 for invasions of privacy that allegedly occurred during 1992,
as might be the case if the employer's former practice of
clandestinely searching through personal effects in employee lock
ers is only later discovered. The employer should investigate poten
tial coverage under any occurrence policies in effect during 1992, as
well as under any claims made policies in effect during 1994.
D. An Example of the Three-Dimensional Model

The following hypothetical scenario demonstrates the signifi
cance of the three-dimensional model of insurance protection. As
sume that an employee files a workers' compensation claim for a
job-related injury on December 1, 1987. The employee subse
quently resigns in February, 1990, and promptly files a lawsuit con
sisting of a number of causes of action. In her complaint, the
employee alleges that the employer immediately responded to her
workers' compensation filing by mounting a three year retaliatory
campaign that consisted of slandering the employee in front of
other employees and defaming her in performance appraisals, lead
fig her to quit her employment in order to escape intolerable work
ing conditions. Upon her resignation, the employee requested
severance payments on the ground that her employment had been
terminated, but her request was denied by the administrators of the
employer's benefits plan. The employee claims that she was con
structively discharged and is now suing for wrongful discharge, in
tentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, defamation,
and an arbitrary and capricious denial of benefits due under an ER
ISA-governed plan. 20
20. These allegations state a viable claim in tort for wrongful discharge on ac
count of the employer's violation of the clear public policy in favor of workers exercis
ing their statutory right to obtain workers' compensation benefits. See, e.g., Kelsay v.
Motorola, Inc., 384 N.E.2d 353 (Ill. 1978). Although courts have been reluctant to per
mit plaintiffs to recover on emotional distress theories merely because they were termi
nated in a brusque manner, the plaintiff might state a cause of action if she alleges that
the employer drove her to resign by outrageous conduct that inflicted severe emotional
distress. See, e.g., Wilson v. Monarch Paper Co., 939 F.2d 1138 (5th Cir. 1991). More
over, the employee states a viable claim for slander with regard to the statements made
to fellow employees and also might state a claim for defamation with respect to the
performance appraisals under a theory of self-publication. See, e.g., Lewis v. Equitable
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In response to this claim, the employer will need to review a
number of liability policies to determine whether insurance cover
age is available. If the employer purchased a CGL occurrence cov
erage policy from Company A for two successive years beginning
January 1, 1987, a CGL occurrence coverage policy from Company
B for the policy year beginning January 1, 1989, and a CGL claims
made policy from Company C each year since January 1, 1990, it
will be necessary to review both policies issued by Company A, the
policy issued by Company B, and the policy issued by Company C
for the year 1990. Moreover, the employer's Workers' Compensa
tion and Employers' Liability Policy might provide coverage to the
extent that the employer seeks a dismissal of part of the civil action
by asserting the exclusivity of the workers' compensation remedy
for the employee's emotional distress injuries. Additionally, liabil
ity policies covering the actions of officers, directors, and plan fidu
ciaries may be implicated, given the probability that the plaintiff
would sue such individuals personally in her complaint. Finally, ex
cess and umbrella policies may provide coverage in the event of a
large plaintiff's verdict. Consequently, in this hypothetical case it is
necessary to review a number of insurance policies to assess poten
tial coverage for the claims asserted by the plaintiff.21
II.

BASIC PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE COVERAGE

With the relevant liability insurance policies in hand, the em
ployment lawyer will be in a position to assist with her client's as
sessment of whether coverage potentially exists. Coverage is a
contractual undertaking by the insurance carrier to accept the risk
of certain losses that may be incurred by the insured party in the
future. Liability policies provide what is known as third-party inLife Assurance Soc'y, 389 N.W.2d 876 (Minn. 1986). A plan participant may bring an
action under ERISA to compel payment of benefits due them under the plan, 29 U.S.c.
§ 1132(a)(I)(B) (1988), but if the plan accords discretionary powers to the administra
tor to determine eligibility for benefits, the court may reverse an administrator's denial
of benefits only if it is found to be arbitrary or capricious. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.
v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
21. Cf, Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co. v. S-W Indus., Inc., 39 F.3d 1324 (6th Cir.
1994) (claims for coverage against seven insurers who provided a variety of policies
during the relevant period that the employee allegedly suffered injury); Fidelity &
Ouar. Ins. Underwriters. Inc. v. Everett I. Brown Co., 25 F.3d 484 (7th Cir. 1994)
(claims for coverage under a liability package which included a primary liability policy.
an excess policy. and a workers' compensation and employers' liability policy); Dixon
Distrib. Co., 641 N.E.2d 395 (claims for coverage under four policies comprising a com
prehensive commercial insurance package, including a primary liability policy. an um
brella policy, and a workers' compensation and employers' liability policy).
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surance, since they afford coverage to the insured for legal liabilities
to third persons that may arise in the future. The scope of coverage
is defined by the written contract (the policy), which must be read
carefully and in its entirety. Although I use the language of the
CGL policy to provide examples of the concepts and principles that
I will be discussing, liability policies generally follow the same basic
format.
The Insurance Services Office's ("ISO")22 CGL policy (10/93
edition) follows a straightforward format. Section I sets forth the
Coverages provided by the policy. Each coverage is stated in terms
of an Insuring Agreement that defines the grant of coverage and
Exclusions that limit the scope of the Insuring Agreement. Section
II defines the persons and entities who are insured under the policy.
Section III defines the limits of insurance, as expressed in the dollar
amounts set forth on the Declarations page of the policy. Section
IV sets forth conditions of the insurance contract, including rights
and duties of both the insurer and the insured. Finally, and of great
importance, Section V provides definitions of the key terms used
throughout the policy. In the subsections that follow, I discuss basic
legal principles that govern the interpretation of a liability policy. I
will focus on selected topics that arise when considering the four
general questions raised by coverage litigation: (1) is the claim
within the scope of coverage, (2) do any exclusions eliminate or
restrict such coverage, (3) has the insured complied with its duties
under the policy, and (4) has the insurer complied with its duty to
provide a defense of the action and to pay losses for a covered
event?
One important caveat is in order. The ISO regularly amends
its standard policy forms and regularly creates optional endorse
ments. Additionally, insurance carriers may draft their own policies
or endorsements that differ from the current ISO forms. Although
the foundational legal principles discussed in this section are un
likely to change in the near future, the specific policy language used
as examples may very well differ from the terms contained in a par
ticular CGL policy. Thus, the growing body of case law interpreting
the availability of coverage for employment related disputes must
be reviewed carefully, since the decisions in many of these cases
even cases only several years old-are predicated on policy lan
22. Insurance Services Office, Inc. is a national insurance industry service organi
zation that develops and files coverage forms, promulgates advisory loss costs, and per
forms other services for and on behalf of its member companies.
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guage no longer used by many insurance carriers. As is always the
case in analyzing a contract, painstaking attention must be paid to
the precise terms of the contract before researching applicable legal
precedent.
A.

Coverage

The CGL policy is not an "all risks" policy that insures against
any and all claims and losses suffered by the employer. Iristead, the
CGL policy obligates the insurer to assume only certain specified
risks. Consequently, the Insuring Agreement simultaneously grants
coverage and also limits coverage. The CGL policy consists of
three separate grants of coverage, the first two of which are perti
nent to employment related claims. The Insuring Agreement of
Coverage A provides coverage for damages resulting from "'bodily
injury' or 'property damage'" and "caused by an 'occurrence'." In
the employment litigation context, the requirement of "bodily in
jury" is crucial because an employee may allege only economic or
reputational injury. Moreover, the definition of "occurrence" as an
"accident" is also important because it would appear to preclude
coverage of claims when the employee alleges that her injuries re
sulted from actions-such as termination of employment-in
tended by her employer.
The Insuring Agreement of Coverage B provides coverage for
damages resulting from" 'personal injury' or 'advertising injury,'"
without a limitation to accidental occurrences. The policy defini
tion of "personal injury" makes clear that Coverage B provides cov~
erage for non-bodily injuries arising out of one or more of the listed
torts, including libel and slander. Given the increasing frequency of
defamation claims being added to employment claims, many em
ployers rely upon Coverage B to demand coverage.
Courts employ basic insurance law principles to determine
whether the employee's complaint potentially asserts that she has
suffered a bodily injury caused by an accident, a personal injury, or
both. Courts uniformly read Insuring Agreements broadly, reason
ing that the insurance company has unilaterally drafted the policy
from a position of far greater sophistication and understanding of
the underwriting process than the average insured. The following
quote is representative of the boilerplate analysis used by courts in
assessing coverage: "Contract terms should be read as a reasonable
person in the insured's position would have understood them....
The insurer has an affirmative duty to define coverage limitations in
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clear and explicit terms .... An insurance contract is generally liber
ally construed against the insurer."23 The principle coverage battles
under the CGL policy in the context of employment related suits,
then, generally concern how broadly the courts will read the terms
"bodily injury," "occurrence," and "personal injury" in favor of the
employer. These specific coverage issues under the CGL policy,
and similar coverage issues under other liability policies, are ana
lyzed by the articles in this symposium.
B.

Exclusions

If coverage is afforded by the Insuring Agreement, it then is
necessary to determine whether the policy excludes the particular
risk from coverage. Insurers regularly define the scope of coverage
in relatively inclusive terms, and then set forth specific limitations
on this broad grant of coverage to tailor the risk assumed under the
policy. Exclusions may be classified generally as serving one or
more of the following interests: (1) designating certain risks as bet
ter covered elsewhere, i.e., with a different insurance product, (2)
designating certain risks as insurable only upon the payment of an
additional premium, and (3) designating certain risks as uninsurable
in the standard market, or in some cases uninsurable in the insur
ance market as a whole. Because an exclusion works to "take
back" a grant of coverage, courts narrowly construe the language of
the exclusion and may shift the burden of proof to the insurer to
prove that the otherwise covered risk has been excluded. 24
Coverage A ("bodily injury" caused by an "occurrence") in
cludes fourteen exclusions, at least three of which may affect cover
age for employment related claims. The "Expected or Intended
Injury" exclusion excludes a class of uninsurable risks, such as an
insured committing an unprovoked battery with the intent to cause
bodily injury; additionally, the exclusion removes certain iilsurable
intentional torts from coverage that are better covered elsewhere,
namely under Coverage B. The "Workers' Compensation" and
23. Lapeka, Inc. v. Security Nat'l Ins. Co., 814 F. Supp. 1540, 1544-45 (D. Kan.
1993) (determining that unintentional discrimination may be an "occurrence," but that
the plaintiffs did not suffer "bodily injury" as a result) (citations omitted).
24. Western Heritage Ins. Co. v. Magic Years Learning Ctrs. and Child Care, Inc.,
45 F.3d 85, 88 (5th Cir. 1995) (noting that under Texas law exclusions are construed
even more strictly against the insurer than coverage provisions); Lapeka, Inc., 814 F.
Supp. at 1545 (noting that the distinction between coverage and exclusionary provisions
is determinative of the burden of proof under Kansas law); Motor Panels, Inc. v. Bir
mingham Fire Ins. Co., No. 3:91CY7198, 1991 WL 516545, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 27,
1991).
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"Employers' Liability" exclusions in Coverage A both serve to re
move coverage on the basis that the risks are better covered else
where, namely the Workers' Compensation and Employers'
Liability Policy. However, the broad language excluding "bodily in
jury to an employee ... arising out of and in the course of employ
ment" likely will exclude some risks that are not within the plain
meaning of the Workers' Compensation and Employers' Liability
coverage, thereby rendering certain claims uninsurable in the stan
dard market. 25
The exclusions in Coverage B are less pertinent to employment
litigation generally, but the exclusion of personal injury "arising out
of the willful violation of a penal statute or ordinance committed by
or with the consent of the insured" designates an uninsurable risk
that may be relevant to some employment claims. 26 Finally, the
ISO "Employment-Related Practices Exclusion" endorsement (10/
93 edition), designed to amend both Coverage A and Coverage B,
represents an attempt by insurers to remove most employment liti
gation from the scope of basic coverage provided by the CGL pol
icy. If this exclusion is used by an insurer in conjunction with the
emerging optional endorsement for "Employment Practices Liabil
ity" coverage, it would represent the insurer's decision that the risk
of employment-related claims will be assumed only for an addi
tional premium. At present, however, several insurers have re
sponded to the tremendous increase in coverage litigation brought
by employers by amending their policies to include various forms of
employment practices related exclusions, leaving these risks unin
surable except under "surplus lines" insurance products in the spe
cialty market.27 Insurers have been successful in enforcing these
exclusions, and so it should be expected that liability policies will
include such clauses with increasing frequency.28
25. Ottumwa Hous. Auth. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 495 N.W.2d 723, 727
(Iowa 1993).
26. See, e.g., MGM, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 855 P.2d 77, 80 (Kan. 1993)
(enforcing exclusion by denying coverage to an employer that subjected its employees
to wiretaps that were illegal under the federal criminal code).
27. Machson & Monteleone, supra note 8, at 711-13.
28. See, e.g., Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 259 (1994)
(exclusions in Workers' Compensation and Employers' Liability Policy), reh'g denied,
40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 808 (1995); Teague Motor Co. v. Federated Servo Ins. Co., 869 P.2d
1130 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (exclusion of employment discrimination from umbrella
policy); Old Republic Ins. Co. V. Comprehensive Health Care Assoc., Inc., 2 F.3d 105
(5th Cir. 1993) (enforcing "sexual abuse" exclusion and "employment-related claim"
exclusion in CGL policy and enforcing an "employment" exclusion in umbrella policy);
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Insured's Duties: Notice and Cooperation

The conditions section of the CGL policy is designed to create
a claim settlement process that ensures effective protection under
the policy for the employer, while also affording the insurer the in
formation it needs to settle the employer's claim properly. The em
ployer's principal duties under the policy are to provide timely
notice of the potentially covered occurrence and to cooperate with
the insurer's investigation and defense of the action. The notifica
tion requirement provides that the employer must notify the insurer
"as soon as practicable of an occurrence or an offense which may
result in a claim" by providing the known details of the occurrence.
Additionally, the employer must notify the insurer as soon as prac
ticable of any claim or suit to which the policy applies by immedi
ately sending "copies of any demands, notices, summonses or legal
papers." This latter duty is particularly important, since the insurer
is under the obligation to defend the insured in the suit and is enti
tled to conduct the litigation.
The employer's failure to comply with its obligations under the
contract certainly will impair the settlement process and may estab
lish a defense to enforcement of the policy in favor of the insurer.
Generally, courts are hesitant to deprive the third party claimant of
a source of funds to satisfy a judgment solely on the basis of the
insured's failure to comply with the notice provisions of the policy.
In many jurisdictions, therefore, the insurer is excused from per
formance under the policy only if the delay in notice has prejudiced
its efforts to investigate and defend the claim. 29 However, the in
surer's duty to provide a defense to the employer does not benefit
the third-party claimant directly. Consequently, courts may be
more willing to preclude an employer from obtaining reimburseReliable Springs Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 869 F.2d 993 (6th Cir. 1989)
(enforcing "discrimination and unfair employment practices" exclusion).
29. KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 9, at § 7.2(e) (describing the balancing test
employed by many courts to determine whether a failure to provide notice prejudices
the insured sufficiently to warrant denying a source of funds to the third party claimant
by excusing the insurer of its duty to pay damages on behalf of the insured); ROBERT H.
JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 404-07 (1987) ("The approach requiring
the insurer to demonstrate it was prejudiced is obtaining an increasing following.").
See, e.g., Thin City Fire Ins. Co. v. King County, 749 F. Supp. 230 (W.D. Wash. 1990)
(employer was denied coverage under policy because insurer was prejudiced when the
employer failed to notify the insurer of the suit until three years after it was filed, four
months after the plaintiff's verdict at trial, and only one day prior to a court-arranged
conference to settle the appeal, despite the employer's claim that it reasonably believed
that its exposure in the case would not exceed the applicable deductible), affd, 942 F.2d
794 (1991).
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ment of its defense costs when it unreasonably delays providing no
tice of the suit to the insurance carrier.30 Therefore, it is vital that
the employment lawyer assist the employer in identifying any and
all liability policies that potentially provide coverage for an occur
rence or claim as soon as possible, thus enabling the employer to
provide prompt notice to the pertinent carriers in order to facilitate
the claim processing and to preserve its right to secure reimburse
ment for any defense costs incurred until such time as the insurer
assumes the defense.
D. Insurer's Duties: Defense and Indemnification

The principal obligation of the insurer is to pay covered losses.
The CGL policy provides that the insurer "will pay those sums that
the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages" for cov
ered losses. This obligation is straightforward. Although complex
disputes may arise over whether the losses are covered under the
policy, the insurer's duty to pay damages on behalf of the insured
usually is not controversial once these matters have been adjudi
cated. 3! An important exception is the line of "bad faith" cases that
involve an insurer refusing to settle a pending claim within the pol
30. See, e.g., SL Indus., Inc. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 607 A.2d 1266, 1272
73 (N.J. 1992). In SL Industries, the employee had sued for age discrimination, and the
carrier had denied coverage on the ground that no "bodily injury" or "personal injury,"
as those terms were defined in the policy, had occurred. Discovery revealed that the
employee was seeking recovery for emotional pain and suffering, for which he had re
ceived treatment. The insured did not disclose this information to the insurer for an
other two years. The court stated that the duty to defend is inextricably linked with the
insurer's right to control the litigation, a right which could no longer be enforced with
respect to the prior two years of litigation. Consequently, the court held that "when the
insured's delay in providing relevant information prevents the insurer from assuming
control of the defense, the insurance company is liable only for that portion of the
defense costs arising after it was informed of the facts triggering the duty to defend."

Id.
31. Refusing to indemnify the employer after the litigation has ended with a ver
dict that falls within the coverage of the policy will likely render the insurer subject to a
tort action for bad faith. See, e.g., Bugni v. Employer's Ins. of Wausau, 405 N.W.2d 84
(Wis. Ct. App. 1987). In Bugni, the insured employer sued for bad faith breach when
the primary and excess carriers refused to indemnify him for his defense expenditures
and the jury verdict entered in favor of the employee. The court held that the jury
verdict-finding a wrongful discharge but no bad faith on the part of the employer
eliminated the insurer's arguments that the allegations concerned intentional actions
excluded by the policy. "[W]e conclude that, once the federal verdict was rendered,
none of the defenses the [insurer] asserted had a reasonable basis in the law. None of
the propositions upon which [the insurer] founded its refusal to pay was fairly debata
ble." Id. The case was remanded for further fact-finding regarding the bad faith claim.
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icy limits, thereby_ exposing the insured to excess liability.32
In contrast to the duty to pay damages, the insurer's "right and
duty" to defend the employer in suits seeking such damages raises
more complex issues. The Insuring Agreements for Coverages A
and B provide that the insurance company "will have the right and
duty to defend any suit seeking" damages that fall within the cover
age provisions. Employment-related litigation often involves fact
specific claims arising in an unsettled or contested area of law. The
resulting extensive discovery and motion practice means that de
fense costs often are as substantial as the ultimate recovery or set
tlement obtained by the employee. Thus, the insured's obligation
to provide a defense is an extremely important part of the Insuring
Agreement. Although many states continue to measure the in
surer's duty to defend solely against the allegations of the underly
ing complaint, other states have more broadly interpreted the
clause to require that the duty to defend be assessed in light of all
32. The landmark case establishing the modern cause of action for "bad faith" in
insurance claims settlement involved an insurer that failed to take account of its in
sured's interests when it declined to settle the case within the policy limits, thereby
subjecting the insured to liability in the amount that the judgment exceeded the policy
limits. Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 328 P.2d 198 (Cal. 1958). Although pre
mised on the general duty of good faith and fair dealing implied in every contract, id. at
200, insurance carriers are subjected to tort damages when they breach this contractual
duty. Cf Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988) (refusing to extend
tort damages beyond the insurance context, holding that only contract damages are
available to an employee suing his employer for a breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing). The unique "bad faith" cause of action in the insurance
context "evolved as a means of imposing sanctions on insurers whose negligence or
intentional misconduct frustrate the smooth functioning of the insurance mechanism."
STEPHEN S. ASHLEY, BAD FAITH AcnONS: LIABILITY AND DAMAGES § 1.11 (1994). If
not subjected to tort damages, insurers would be free to withhold a reasonable settle
ment offer in an effort to obtain a defendant's verdict at trial, knowing that their expo
sure for this calculated risk is "capped" by the policy limits. Id. at § 2.03.
The "bad faith" doctrine was raised in an interesting manner by an employer in
Ottumwa Hous. Auth. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 495 N.W.2d 723 (Iowa 1993).
In Ottumwa, the employee had sued for sex discrimination and filed a claim for work
ers' compensation benefits. The insurer defended the workers' compensation claim but
refused to defend the discrimination suit under either the Workers' Compensation pol
icy or the CGL policy. The employee eventually withdrew her claim for workers' com
pensation benefits in the face of a vigorous defense and pursued only her civil claims.
The employer claimed in later litigation against the insurer that the insurer had acted in
bad faith by refusing to settle the workers' compensation claim, on the theory that set
tlement of the workers' compensation claim would have assisted with the disposition of
the civil claim. The court made short work of responding to this assertion: "Because
there was no basis for [the employee's] workers' compensation claim, State Farm
under the duty to defend provision-had every right to defend the claim in the way it
did." Id. at 730.
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relevant extrinsic facts.33 As one court recently explained, the lib
eral rule is warranted because employers "expect their coverage
and defense benefits to be determined by the nature of the claim
against them, not by the fortuity of how the plaintiff, a third party
chooses to phrase the complaint."34 Even when judged only against
the allegations in the complaint, the general rule is that the duty to
defend is triggered when the potential exists for the employee to
prevail against an insured on the basis of a covered occurrence or
claim.35
33. See generally 7C JOHN A. ApPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRAcncE § 4683
(Berdal ed., 1979, West Supp.). For example, Texas and Indiana have held to the "four
comers" rule in the face of change, limiting the duty of defense to cases in which the
complaint pleads a covered injury. Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Comprehensive Health
Care Ass'n, Inc., 2 F.3d 105, 107 (5th Cir. 1993); Transamerica Ins. Servs. v. Kopko, 570
N.E.2d 1283, 1285 (Ind. 1991) (rejecting the liberal test adopted by the court of ap
peals). In contrast, California has adopted the more liberal test, construing the duty to
defend to be implicated when either the facts alleged in the complaint or extrinsic facts
raise the potential that the complaint might later be amended to seek recovery for a
covered injury. Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 419 P.2d 168, 177 (Cal. 1966) (The duty to
defend is based on the "facts which the insurer learns from the complaint, the insured,
or other sources. An insurer, therefore bears a duty to defend its insured whenever it
ascertains facts which give rise to the potential of liability under the policy.").
34. SL Indus., Inc. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 607 A.2d 1266, 1272 (N.J.
1992). One commentator notes that this rule "is sensible: an insurer should not be
allowed to escape its obligations by ignoring true facts, simply because the plaintiff
failed to allege them." JERRY, supra note 29, at 563. See, e.g., American Guar. and
Liab. Ins. Co. v. Vista Medical Supply, 699 F. Supp. 787, 794 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (duty to
defend is triggered when employee alleges in her declaration in support of the com
plaint that the employer made false statements to humiliate her, although the complaint
does not allege facts giving rise to potential liability for defamation). The liberal rule is
required in states that have adopted notice pleading, since the complaint in these juris
dictions is an unreliable gauge of the facts forming the basis of the plaintiffs claims.
Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Hartford Ins. Co., 621 N.E.2d 796, 798 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993). Of
course, the "liberal" rule might work in the insurer's favor if the complaint potentially
triggers coverage, but the facts surrounding the matter establish that no coverage under
the policy in fact is triggered. See, e.g., Northern Ins. Co. of New York v. Morgan, Nos.
1 CA-CV 92-0020, 1 CA-CV 92-0553,1995 WL 564722 at *2 (Ariz. Ct. App. Sept. 26,
1995) (holding that the insurer had no duty to defend because the sexual conduct in
question either was intentional and excluded from coverage or was consensual and
therefore nonactionable, regardless of the phrasing of the allegations in the complaint).
35. Compare Ellis v. Transcontinental Ins. Co., 619 So. 2d 1130 (La. Ct. App.
1993) (wrongful discharge claim premised on retaliation for assertion of FLSA rights
triggered the duty to defend because the retaliatory actions pleaded in the complaint
included invasions of privacy, humiliation and discrimination) with French Cleaners,
Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., No. CV 92-0518285, 1995 WL 91423, at *4 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Feb. 17, 1995) (no coverage for age discrimination claim that alleged no
defamatory statements by the employer that caused injury: "A different question might
have been presented if [the employee] had sought damages for injury to her profes
sional reputation as a result of [the employer's] allegedly discriminatory treatment of
her on account of her age.").

~
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It is universally acknowledged that the duty to defend is

broader than the duty to pay losses under the policy. This is true in
a very obvious sense, given that the insurer promises to defend any
suit alleging damages covered by the policy, whereas the insurer
will not have to pay any sums if the employer prevails in the litiga
tion. 36 The breadth of the duty to defend is more expansive than
the duty to pay in other important respects as well. First, the gen
eral rule is that a complaint that raises one -claim within the policy
coverage generally triggers a duty to defend the insured against all
claims asserted in the complaint, due to the difficulty of bifurcating
control over the litigation or of later apportioning the costs when
the case involves a number of interlocking and overlapping
claims.37 ~oreover, the policy provides that the duty to defend ter
36. In California, which has adopted the extrinsic facts test of the duty to defend,
the rule is summarized as follows:
The duty to defend arises as long as the facts (either expressed or implied in
the third party's complaint, or as learned from other sources) give rise to a
potentially covered claim, even though the insurer's investigation produces
facts showing the claim is baseless. It is the insurer's duty to prove the allega
tions false.
Devin v. United Servo Auto. Ass'n, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 263, 268 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (cita
tions omitted). See also City of Old Town v. American Employers Ins. Co., 858 F.
Supp. 264, 269 (D. Me. 1994); Intermountain Gas Co. v. Industrial Indemn. Co., 868
P.2d 510, 513 (Idaho Ct. App. 1994).
37. See, e.g., Vienna Family Medical Assoc., Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 872 F. Supp.
1509 (S.D. W. Va. 1995) (insurer had duty to defend seven count complaint brought by
former employee, although many of the asserted claims did not fall within the coverage
provisions); Wong v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1 (Cal. Ct. App.
1993) ("If a complaint states several possible theories of recovery, the insurer must
defend the entire claim unless and until the insurer is able to limit the complaint to
theories for which it has provided no insurance."); Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Hartford Ins.
Co., 621 N.E.2d 796, 800 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993). But see Great American, 621 N.E.2d at
801-02 (Ford, P.]., dissenting) (arguing that the court should more strictly assess
whether covered and non-covered claims arise from the same occurrence); SL Indus
tries, 607 A.2d at 1280 (holding· that the duty to defend arises only with respect to
covered claims and rejecting the majority rule presuming that these costs cannot be
apportioned between insurer and insured).
A collateral effect of broadly construing the duty to defend in this way is to raise a
significant conflict of interest between the insurer conducting the litigation and the em
ployer/defendant. Because the insurer will only be obliged to pay covered damages
awarded in the suit, it has a financial interest in ensuring that a verdict will be more
heavily weighted toward non-covered claims. Given this conflict, states adopt a variety
of responses, including: allowing the insured to select the defense counsel, requiring the
insurer to reimburse the employer's counsel to monitor the litigation, or simply ignoring
the potential for conflict altogether. Eric M. Holmes, A Conflicts-of-Interest Roadmap
for Insurance Defense Counsel: Walking an Ethical Tightrope Without a Net, 26 WIL·
LAMEITE L. REv. 1 (1989); Todd R. Smyth, Annotation, Duty of Insured to Pay for
Independent Counsel When Conflict of Interest Exists Between Insured and Insurer, 50
A.L.R. 4TH 932 (1986 & Supp. 1994).
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minates when the policy limit has been exhausted "in the payment
of judgments or settlements," and so many courts hold that the in
surer cannot refuse to provide a defense in ongoing litigation even
if it has agreed to pay the policy limits into court to be applied
against the eventual judgment or settlement. 38 Finally, as analyzed
in the next section of this article, courts have employed the doctrine
of reasonable expectations to expand the duty to defend.
Wrongfully refusing to provide a defense is a breach of con
tract by the insurer. In subsequent coverage litigation, the em
ployer is entitled to reimbursement of its defense expenditures, in
addition to indemnification for covered judgments or settlements.
Additionally, the employer may be entitled to recover the attor
neys' fees and costs incurred in securing this reimburs.ement. 39
Many jurisdictions hold that an insurer that wrongfully refuses to
provide a defense will be "estopped from raising noncoverage as a
defense under the indemnity provisions of the policy."40 This rem
edy potentially is significant, since the duty to defend is broader
than the duty to indemnify. Consequently, if an insurer has a duty
to defend an employer, but the litigation ultimately establishes that
the employer is liable only for non-covered events, an insurer that
fails to provide the defense will be required to reimburse the em
ployer notwithstanding the absence of a covered occurrence. Addi
tionally, if the employer resolves the matter by settlement, this
same logic leads some courts to preclude the insurer from challeng
ing the amount of the settlement or attempting to allocate it among
covered and non-covered claims.41 Consequently, a prudent insurer
will either assume the defense under a reservation of rights to later
deny coverage and seek reimbursement or will seek a declaratory
judgment of its obligations immediately.42 Finally, some courts
have extended the "bad faith" analysis to apply to the insurer's re
38. JERRY, supra note 29 at 574-75. Cf. Ellis, 619 So. 2d 1130 (holding that CGL
and umbrella carriers who refused to defend an action where some of the allegations
potentially came within the policy coverage were liable for the attorney fees expended
by the insured and the settlement paid to the employee, subject to the trial court's
assessment of the reasonableness of those sums).
39. See, e.g., Jostens, Inc. v. Mission Ins. Co., 387 N.W.2d 161, 168 (Minn. 1986).
40. Society of Mount Carmel v. National Ben Franklin Ins. Co., 643 N.E.2d 1280,
1292 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (noting the congruity of Illinois and California law on this
point).
41. JERRY, supra note 29, at 579-84.
42. For an example of a case where the insurance company gambled and won, see
Zack Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. 93-7015, 1995 WL 33135, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 25,
1995) (insured argued that failure of insurer to seek declaratory judgment or to provide
a defense under a reservation of rights estopped the insurer from denying coverage;

26

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18:5

fusal to provide a defense, presumably on the ground that even the
foregoing remedies may be insufficient to prevent the insurance
company from strategically refusing to expend large amounts in de
fense costs until forced to do so by an employer who brings suit.43
The burden of the duty to defend is accepted by insurers in
order to obtain the extremely valuable right to control the litigation
and disposition of the underlying claim. This control is crucial in
the employment litigation setting, since emotions often run high.
Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
held that a law firm could not prevent its liability insurer from set
tling a hostile environment and sexual harassment suit. 44 Although
the firm argued that the litigation was groundless and that settling
the suit would injure its reputation, and also that the settlement
would preclude it from pursuing a later suit for malicious prosecu
tion, the court permitted the insurer to settle with the plaintiff
based on the clear provisions in the policy.45 As the court noted, an
employer wishing to retain control over settlement of cases (as
many professionals choose to do in their malpractice policies) must
purchase a policy that affords this right. 46
however, the court found that complaint filed by insured's employee did not trigger the
duty to defend, thereby relieving insurer of any obligations}.
43. See, e.g., TIbbs v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 755 F.2d 1370 (9th Cir. 1985) (affirming
an award of $600,000 punitive damages for breach of the duty to defend); State Farm
Fire & Casualty Co. v. Price, 684 P.2d 524, 532 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984) (remanding case to
determine whether the insurer's breach of the duty to defend amounted to closing its
eyes to the facts a.nd acting in bad faith).
In the employment setting, it appears likely that an insurer's denial of coverage will
be premised on a good faith objection to the insured's reading of the policy, given the
sharply contested legal issues involved. See, e.g., Vienna Family Medical Assoc., Inc. v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 872 F. Supp. 1509, 1514 (S.D.W. Va. 1995); Clark-Peterson Co. Inc. v.
Independent Ins. Assoc., Ltd., 514 N.W.2d 912,916 (Iowa 1994):
Defendants were not overly litigious, they merely believed no coverage ex
isted under the policy, a contention with which we initially agreed. Once a
final determination was made, the defendants promptly paid the entire claim.
Even prior to this, [the insurer] paid attorney fees in the underlying defense
and paid half the judgment at the termination of trial, reserving the right to
reclaim the fees and portion of the judgment paid. With this degree of cooper
ation it cannot be said that defendants were overly litigious.... The coverage
was reasonably debatable in view of our final determination.
Id. (citation omitted).
44. Caplan v. Fellheimer Eichen Braverman & Kaskey, 68 F.3d '828 (3d Cir.
1995).
45. Id. at 839.
46. Id. at 839-40 ("It is not appropriate for us to amend the policy here in order to
give [the insured] a type of coverage for which it didn't contract.").
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INTERPRETING THE INSURANCE CONTRACT

Coverage is determined not only by interpreting the terms of
the insurance contract as written, but also by applying judicially
created doctrines that may expand the insured's rights beyond a
strict reading of the policy language. As one leading commentator
has summarized, "mudges in insurance cases not only make insur
ance law; sometimes they also make insurance."47 Conversely,
courts will refuse to enforce an insured's rights under even an un
ambiguous insurance policy if such enforcement would violate pub
lic policy. In such a case, it is appropriate to say that sometimes
judges also "unmake" insurance. In this section of the Article, I
provide a basic overview of these two key principles that govern
interpretation of the terms of an insurance contract.
A. From Contra Proferentem to Reasonable Expectations:
Judge-Made Insurance
If a written contract contains an ambiguity, it is a well-settled
maxim that the courts generally will prefer the interpretation favor
ing the party who did not draft the language in question. 48
Although not limited to cases involving adhesion contracts, the
maxim contra proferentem is followed more rigorously when a sig
nificant disparity of bargaining power exists between the parties,
and the stronger party supplies all of the terms of the written con
tract. This, of course, is the situation in the typical insurance trans
action, even in the case when a business entity is purchasing
commercial insurance.49 Consequently, an employer asserting cov
erage should prevail if it is able to demonstrate that one reasonable
reading of the policy provides coverage, even if the employer's in
terpretation is not the only, or even the most, reasonable manner in
which to construe the policy language. 5o This rule of interpretation
47. ABRAHAM, supra note 10, at 10l.
48. The maxim, omnia praesumuntur contra pro!erentem, is widely cited and is
embodied in REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 206 (1981).
49. Of course, very large commercial entities (including, of course, insurance
companies) are sometimes able to negotiate insurance coverage in a manner that more
closely resembles contract negotiation between two parties having equal competence,
expertise, and bargaining power. See, e.g., Falmouth Nat'l Bank v. TIcor TItle Ins. Co.,
920 F.2d 1058, 1061-62 (1st Cir. 1990) (general rules of construction regarding insurance
policies do not apply to a case involving a sophisticated insured that had negotiated
specific terms in the policy tailored to a particular lawsuit).
50. "There are literally thousands of judicial opinions resolving insurance cover
age disputes in favor of claimants on the basis that a provision of the insurance policy at
issue was ambiguous and therefore should be construed against the insurer." KEETON
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provides one of the justifications for the universal judicial practice
of reading coverage provisions broadly and exclusions narrowly.
Twenty-five years ago, however, commentators began to recog
nize that the courts were interpreting insurance contracts in a man
ner that could not be explained solely by the maxim contra
proferentem. In a path breaking article, then Professor Robert
Keeton articulated the "doctrine of reasonable expectations" to ex
plain the interpretive approach increasingly taken by courts since
the early 1960s.51 Judge Keeton summarizes the doctrine in his
treatise as follows: "In general, courts will protect the reasonable
expectations of applicants, insureds, and intended beneficiaries re
garding the coverage afforded by insurance contracts even though a
careful examination of the policy provisions indicates that such ex
pectations are contrary to the expressed intention of the insurer."52
& WIDISS, supra note 9, at § 6.3(a)(2). See, e.g., Western Heritage Ins. Co. v. Magic
Years Learning Ctr. and Child Care, Inc., 45 F.3d 85, 88 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that a
. policy provides coverage for a claim of sexual harassment when a "physical abuse" cov
erage endorsement renders later exclusions ambiguous, since the court must adopt the
construction of the policy urged by the insured so long as it is not unreasonable); Trust
ees, Missoula County Sch. Dist. No.1 v. Pacific Employer's Ins. Co., 866 P.2d 1118,
1124 (Mont. 1993) (holding that a policy exclusion of damages paid for sums owed
pursuant to a contract was ambiguous with regard to the employee's statutory claims
for bad faith termination and recovery of lost wages and must be read in favor of the
employer).
51. Robert Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83
HARV. L. REV. 961, 967 (1970).
52. KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 9, § 6.3(a)(3). For commentary on the doc
trine, see Laurie Kindel Fett, Note, The Reasonable Expectations Doctrine: An Alterna
tive to Bending and Stretching Traditional Tools of Contract Interpretation, 18 WM.
MITCHELL L. REv. 1113 (1992) (student note exploring the doctrine under Minnesota
law); Roger C. Henderson, The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in Insurance Law
After Two Decades, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 823 (1990) (providing a detailed historical account
of the doctrine and asserting that the doctrine is principled and can be applied within
justiciable guidelines); Stephen J. Ware, A Critique of the Reasonable Expectations Doc
trine, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1461 (1989) (student note providing a "law and economics"
critique of the doctrine); Mark C. Rahdert, Reasonable Expectations Reconsidered, 18
CONN. L. REv. 323, 392 (1986) (arguing for refinements to the doctrine in response to
the fading appeal that the doctrine holds for courts and commentators and contending
that courts should "discard their unfortunate tendency to speak the platitudes of rea
sonable expectations without undertaking a careful and systematic analysis"); William
A. Mayhew, Reasonable Expectations: Seeking a Principled Application, 13 PEPP. L.
REv. 267, 287-96 (1986) (formulating standards for applying the doctrine); Scott B.
Krider, The Reconstruction of Insurance Contracts Under the Doctrine of Reasonable
Expectations, 18 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 155 (1984) (student note arguing that regulatory
efforts address the underlying problems in the insurance industry in a manner superior
to judicial use of reasonable expectations); William Mark Lashner, A Common Law
Alternative to the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in the Construction of Insurance
Contracts, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1175, 1208 (1982) (student note arguing that "any provi
sion which undercuts the bargained-for insurance coverage must [bel specifically ex
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In other words, even when the policy language unambiguously pre

cludes coverage, under certain circumstances courts will hold that
coverage exists. 53
Professor Abraham has organized the "reasonable expecta
tions" line of cases in a persuasive manner by suggesting that there
are two distinct applications of the doctrine. 54 In "misleading im
pression" cases, the courts find that the insurer has in some manner
influenced the insured to believe that coverage exists despite the
precise terms of the policy. These cases represent a logical exten
sion of the maxim contra proferentem by acknowledging that in
some instances it may be unjust to enforce even unambiguous pol
iey terms, given the nature of the bargaining process and relative
bargaining strength of the parties. 55 In "mandated coverage" cases,
by contrast, the courts determine that coverage is desirable and will
be imposed despite the policy terms in order to effectuate a general
goal of broader risk spreading. These latter cases stand "as criti
cism of the insurance market as a whole," rather than an indictment
of the insurer for misleading behavior and are best regarded as judi
plained to the insured" to be enforceable); Kenneth S. Abraham, Judge-Made Law and
Judge-Made Insurance: Honoring the Reasonable Expectations of the Insured, 67 VA. L.
REv. 1151 (1981) (article that served as the basis for the book chapter discussed in the
text accompanying infra notes 54-56).
53. Courts traditionally invoke contra proferentem with the caveat that the doc
trine is not a license for courts to rewrite the insurance contract between the parties.
See, e.g., Lapeka, Inc. v. Security Nat'\. Ins. Co., 814 F. Supp. 1540, 1545 (D. Kan. 1993)
(A court may not "torture words in order to import ambiguity" into the policy, nor may
the court "make another contract for the parties. Its function is to enforce the contract
as made."). The doctrine of reasonable expectations breaks with this traditionallimita
tion on the scope of contract interpretation. As Professor Henderson correctly states,
decisions that rely on the doctrine of reasonable expectations "solely to construe policy
language do not support a new principle at all.... The doctrine of reasonable expecta
tions, if it involves a new principle at all, may apply without regard to any ambiguity. It
may affect the substantive provisions of the policy, regardless of how the policy is
drafted." Henderson, supra note 52, at 827.
54. ABRAHAM, supra note 10, at 104.
55. Judge Keeton lists five "pragmatic reasons why coverage limitations that con
flict with reasonable expectations ought not to be enforced even when the limitations
are both explicit and unambiguous in policy forms," all of which support the "mislead
ing impression" cases. KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 9, at § 6.3(a)(4). The reasons
offered are: (1) insurance contracts are complex documents that the average insured
finds difficult to understand, (2) the insured receives a copy of the policy only after
purchasing it, when the motivation to read the policy is minimal, (3) the insurer is able
to exercise its expertise and superior bargaining power by inserting specific limitations
in the policy that work an unconscionable advantage over the insured, (4) general mar
keting techniques engender expectations of comprehensive coverage, and (5) the insur
ance policy is titled and structured to emphasize coverage and downplay exclusions. Id.
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cial creation of insurance. 56
1.

"Misleading Impression" Cases

Clark-Peterson Co., Inc. v. Independent Insurance Associates,
Ltd. provides a good example of a court using the "misleading
impression" application of the doctrine of reasonable expectations.
Clark-Peterson suffered a substantial judgment in a suit brought by
an employee alleging a discriminatory termination on the basis of
his alcoholism. The policy provided coverage for "[p]ersonal
[i]njury," defined to include "[d]iscrimination or humiliation;" how
ever, the policy also limited this coverage to accidents which unin
tentionally cause such injury and later in the policy excluded
liability for discrimination "committed by or at [Clark-Peterson's]
direction."58 The Iowa Supreme Court agreed with the trial court's
finding that the employee's suit was "not covered under the precise
wording of the policy," since the discriminatory termination in this
case was an intentional act committed by Clark-Peterson. 59 Never
theless, the court found that the insurer must provide coverage on
the basis of the reasonable expectations doctrine.
In order to invoke the reasonable expectations doctrine under
Iowa law, an employer must first demonstrate either that the policy
is "such that an ordinary layperson would misunderstand its cover
age" or that the employer's coverage expectations were fostered by
"circumstances attributable to the insurer."6o The court found that
the ordinary layperson could reasonably expect coverage for such
"an unusual and controversial liability, liability which no doubt
came as a shock" to Clark-Peterson, given that the policy provided
coverage for personal injury resulting from discrimination. 61 The
court distinguished intentional racial or sexual discrimination-con
duct as to which no reasonable employer could expect coverage
from intentional discrimination on the basis of alcoholism, the con
duct giving rise to liability in this case. 62
Nevertheless, the court emphasized that the doctrine is limited
57

56. ABRAHAM, supra note 10, at 109.
57. 492 N.W.2d 675 (Iowa 1992) (en bane).
58. Id. at 676 n.3.
59. Id. at 677.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 678.
62. The court expressed some sympathy for an employer who may have bona fide
business reasons to fire an alcoholic employee, albeit illegal and discriminatory reasons.
Id. at 678 n.6.
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in scope, to the extent that bare reasonable expectations of cover
age are not sufficient in themselves to override policy terms.
Although acknowledging that the reasonable expectations doctrine
"has become a vital part of our law interpreting insurance policies,"
the court stressed that the doctrine "does not contemplate the ex
pansion of insurance coverage on a general equitable basis. The
doctrine is carefully circumscribed; it can only be invoked where an
exclusion '(1) is bizarre or oppressive, (2) eviscerates terms explic
itly agreed to, or (3) eliminates the dominant purpose of the trans
action. "'63 The court held that the clear grant of coverage for
claims relating to injuries resulting from discriIpination was later
eviscerated, even if not eliminated entirely, by other sections of the
policy. Thus, Clark-Peterson was able to satisfy the second test.
The court's rationale unambiguously was premised on the quasi
deceptive (even if benign) structure of the policy and the difference
in expertise and bargaining power between the parties.
To deny discrimination coverage in the present case would be to
withdraw with the policy's left hand what is given with its right.
In a fundamental sense, of course, this is the proper function of
any exclusion clause in an insurance policy. The reasonable ex
pectations doctrine does no violence to this proper function by its
limited intrusion into it. The doctrine means only that when,
within its metes and bounds definition, an exclusion acts in tech
nical ways to withdraw a promised coverage, it must do so forth
rightly, with words that are, if not flashing, at least sufficient to
assure that a reasonable policy purchaser will not be caught
unawares.
The reasonable expectations doctrine is a recognition that
insurance policies are sold on the basis of the coverage they
63. Id. at 677 (quoting Aid (Mutual) Ins. v. Steffen, 423 N.W.2d 189, 192 (1988)).
The "misleading impression" cases probably encompass the more extreme cases in
which an insured argues that the policy is "unconscionable" or provides "illusory cover
age" for the premium charged. In Clark-Peterson, the court applied a test that sensibly
combined the interest in upholding reasonable expectations with the interest in preclud
ing the insurer from obtaining unconscionable advantages. Professor Keeton suggests
that in order to avoid
claims based on either reasonable expectations or unconscionability, the in
surer should be required to adopt measures which guarantee (1) either that
the purchaser has actual expectations consistent with described coverage be
cause the purchaser was made aware of the limitations during the marketing
transaction, or that it would be unreasonable for an insured to have expecta
tions that are not consistent with the insurance policy provisions, and (2) that
the premium charged appropriately reflects the actual scope of risk that the
policy provisions define.
KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 9, at 641-42.
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promise. When later exclusions work to eat up all, or even sub
stantially all, of a vital coverage, they cannot rest on technical
wording, obscure to the average insurance purchaser. At some
point fairness demands that the coverage clause itself be self
limiting.64
Although the court rejected a purely equitable approach, the "fair
ness" of extending coverage beyond the policy terms was premised
on the court's belief that the insurer engendered reasonable expec
tations with its policy format.
It is useful to compare Clark-Peterson with fostens, Inc. v.
Northfield Insurance CO.65 In fostens, the Minnesota Court of Ap
peals rejected the employer's argument that coverage should be af
forded under the doctrine of reasonable expectations, based on its
finding that the discrimination "coverage" provided by the um
brella policy was effectively negated immediately in the insuring
agreement itself. The fostens court held that the employer could
have no reasonable expectation of coverage for discriminatory em
ployment practices arising from the insurance market generally, nor
from the terms of the policy, since the exclusionary language was
included as part of the definition of "discrimination" in the insuring
provision. 66 In short, the court -refused to create insurance since the
insurer did not contribute to any mistaken beliefs that an employer
64. Clark-Peterson, 492 N.W.2d at 679.
65. 527 N.W.2d 116 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
66. [W]e believe that the policy's "except for" language immediately negated
any legitimate expectation engendered. Jostens could not have been under
more than a momentary delusion that the policy afforded coverage for the
costs at issue, given the juxtaposition of the exclusions to the policy's mention
of discrimination; thus, the reasonable expectations doctrine does not provide
coverage.
Id. at 118. The court also rejected the separate claim by the employer that the policy
provided only illusory coverage for discrimination, holding that "the doctrine of illusory
coverage is best applied ... where part of the premium is specifically allocated to a
particular type or period of coverage and that coverage turns out to be functionally
nonexistent," or where the employer reasonably believes that "some specific part of its
premium was allocated to discrimination coverage." Id. at 119. Because Jostens did
not pay a separate premium for the extremely limited discrimination coverage and be
cause the limited nature of the coverage was expressed in a manner that defeated any
reasonable expectations that Jostens might hold to the contrary, the policy terms were
enforced as written. Cf Fidelity and Ouar. Ins. Underwriters, Inc. v. Everett I. Brown
Co., 25 F.3d 484, 490 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding that the Indiana law of "illusory cover
age"-Iimited to cases where a premium was paid for coverage that will not provide
benefits under any set of reasonably expected circumstances~is inapplicable when the
employer is covered for many potential claims under the terms of the policy); Wayne
Township Bd. of School Comm. v. Indiana Ins. Co., 650 N.E.2d 1205, 1212 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1995).
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reasonably could have held about the scope of coverage under the
umbrella policy.
The "misleading impression" application of the reasonable ex
pectations doctrine provides. employers with a powerful tool to
avoid a strict reading of the policy terms, but this theory is not un- .
bounded. If the policy language and marketing techniques em
ployed by the insurer scrupulously avoid engendering expectations
on the part of the reasonable employer that the dispute in question
is covered by the policy, then the insurance contract most likely will
be enforced as written.
2.

Mandated Coverage Cases

A more dramatic application of the reasonable expectations
doctrine occurs when the court finds coverage despite the absence
of any misleading conduct attributable to the insurer. Professor
Abraham contends that the tremendous expansion of the insurer's
duty to provide a legal defense to the insured is an example of the
"mandated coverage" application of the doctrine of reasonable ex
pectations. 67 The California courts recently struggled with the
"mandated coverage" application of the reasonable expectations
doctrine in a series of cases that determined the scope of the duty to
defend provision in workers' compensation policies. In recent
years, the California Supreme Court has held that civil claims for
injuries resulting from the termination of employment, including
emotional distress that does not result in a physical disability, are
preempted by the exclusive remedy provided under workers' com
pensation law. 68 On the basis of these cases, the California Court of
Appeal decided that when an employee sues for wrongful discharge
and claims damages for emotional distress caused by the termina
tion, the employer is entitled to a defense of the civil action by its
workers' compensation carrier. The court reasoned that the em
ployer "could reasonably have expected [the insurer] to asse·rt the
bar of workers' compensation as an affirmative defense in the. un
derlying case."69 Because it is questionable that a reasonable em
ployer would expect its workers' compensation carrier to defend a
67. Abraham discusses the seminal case in this area, Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 419
P.2d 168 (Cal. 1966). ABRAHAM, supra note to, at 110-12.
68. Livitsanos v. Superior Court, 828 P.2d 1195 (Cal. 1992); Shoemaker v. Myers,
801 P.2d 1054 (Cal. 1990).
69. Wong v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1, 6 (Cal. Ct. App.
1993), overruled by La Jolla Beach and Tennis Club, Inc. v. Industrial Indemnity Co., 36
Cal. Rptr. 2d 100, 884 P.2d 1048 (Cal. 1995) (en banc).
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civil suit in which the employee makes no claim for benefits under
the workers' compensation laws, this case is best understood as
mandating a specific kind of coverage not otherwise available in the
insurance market: protection against the costs of defending claims
in civil suits that seek recovery for injuries compensable only under
the workers' compensation statutes.7° Needless to say, this case
represented a dramatic expansion of the duty to defend provision in
the Workers' Compensation Policy.
The scope of the duty to defend under a workers' compensa
tion policy was finally resolved by the California Supreme Court in
La lolla Beach and Tennis Club, Inc. v. Industrial Indemnity Co. 71
An employee of La Jolla filed suit alleging a racially discriminatory
termination that also amounted to an intentional infliction of emo
tiortal distress. La Jolla tendered defense of the case to its workers'
compensation carrier, which refused to defend the action. La Jolla
pleaded the exclusivity of the workers' compensation remedy as an
affirmative defense, settled the lawsuit with its employee before the
issues were adjudicated, and then sought recovery from its insurer
for breach of its duty to defend and for indemnification. The trial
court entered summary judgment for the insurer, but the court of
appeal reversed this judgment and found that the employer was en
titled to a defense. 72 The court expressed its reluctance to impose
additional burdens on the workers' compensation system, but nev
ertheless found that the "wide-ranging obligation" of the duty to
defend compelled the result it reached since the claimed injury of
emotional distress "had the potential of coming within the scope of
the Workers' Compensation Act [and] this potential would in turn
give rise to a duty to defend. "73 The court reasoned that if the em
ployer successfully established that it did not discriminate against
its employee, but the employee nevertheless established that he suf
fered emotional distress as a result of the termination, the em
ployee's suit eventually would be reduced to a claim for benefits
under the workers' compensation statutes. Thus, the civil action
raised the potential that the employee ultimately would be asserting
a claim for benefits that would be covered under the workers' com
pensationinsurance policy.74
70. Cf ABRAHAM, supra note 10, at 111.
71. 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 656 (Cal. ct. App. 1994), rev'd, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 100,884 P.2d
1048 (Cal. 1995) (en bane).
72. Id.
73. La Jolla, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 659, 661 (relying on Wong, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 1.).
74. Id. at 662.
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The California Supreme Court, en banc, reversed the court of
appeal and found that no duty to defend existed on these facts. In
its opinion the court quite clearly distinguished the different appli
c~tions of. the reasonable expectations doctrine regarding an in
surer's duty to defend. First, the court acknowledged as a general
matter that the reasonable expectations of the insured will be
respected when the policy is "ambiguous" due to the language used
or its placement in the pOlicy.75 The court found that the policy
unambiguously promised only to defend any claim, proceeding, or
suit for benefits under the workers" compensation law and that the
underlying suit did not seek such benefits.76 In short, the court
found that the case did not fall within the "misleading impression"
application of the doctrine of reasonable expectations.
However, the employer explicitly urged the court to employ a
broader test of reasonable expectations by arguing that employers
who purchase liability insurance packages (including CGL and
workers' compensation policies) are entitled to receive the "seam
less insurance protection" that they reasonably expect. 77 This more
expansive claim amounts to a request that the courts mandate cov
erage to "fill the gaps" in the insurance package, an invitation that
the supreme court refused in this case. The court found that the
employer could not reasonably expect seamless coverage, especially
since, by purchasing several different policies, the employer mani
fested its understanding that each policy was limited in scope. 78
The court further found that the underlying suit raised no potential
for a covered judgment, since workers' compensation benefits may
be awarded only through the administrative process established by
the workers' compensation law. To hold otherwise, the court rea
soned, would amount to converting the duty to defend in a workers'
compensation policy into an unlimited litigation insurance policy.
There is always some possibility that facts alleged in one forum
could, in the future, form the basis for a covered claim in a differ
ent action. Were this the test, however, any judicial or adminis
trative action involving an employer-employee relationship could
be characterized as a "predecessor" claim for workers' compen
sation benefits.

75.
100, 106,
76.
77.
78.

La Jolla Beach and Tennis Oub, Inc. v. Industrial Indem. Co., 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d
884 P.2d 1048, 1054 (Cal. 1995).
Id. at 108-09, 884 P.2d at 1056-57.
Id. at 109, 884 P.2d at 1057.
Id.
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Rather, the test is whether the underlying action for which
defense and indemnity is sought potentially seeks relief within the
coverage of the policy.... Thus, the Court of Appeal fundamen
tally misconstrued the kind of potential coverage that gives rise
to a duty to defend when it concluded that [the insurer] had a
duty to defend the civil action merely because [the employee]
might, at some indeterminate time in the future, file a workers'
compensation claim that did fall within [the insurer's] coverage. 79

In short, the supreme court rejected the "mandated coverage" ap
plication of the reasonable expectations doctrine on the facts of the
La lolla case.
Nevertheless, it remains the case that the broad duty to defend
under California law is premised on precisely the rationale that the
supreme court rejected in La lolla: that the substance of the claims,
and not a third party claimant's erroneous pleading, should deter
mine the scope of the duty.sO The opinion of the court of appeal in
La lolla, then, appears to apply the reasonable expectations doc
trine more consistently with the precedents and might be followed
in other jurisdictions willing to accept the far-reaching ramifications
of the "mandated coverage" application of the doctrine of reason
able expectations. The supreme court reversal probably represents
the judgment that the harsh reality of the business and insurance
environment in California should override the extension of reason
able expectations doctrine, which is to say that the court declined to
mandate litigation coverage in a situation where to do so would
79. Id. at 110, 884 P.2d at 1058.
80. The court claimed to follow the analysis set out in the seminal duty to defend
case, Gray v. Zurich Ins: Co., 419 P.2d 168 (Cal. 1966), but there is no easy reconcilia
tion of the two cases. In Gray, the insured was sued for maliciously and intentionally
assaulting the plaintiff, and eventually suffered a plaintiff's jury verdict and an award of
damages. Injuries to third persons resulting from the insured's intentional acts were not
within the scope of coverage of the liability policy. However, the court held that the
insurer breached its duty to defend, since the plaintiff "could have amended his com
plaint to allege merely negligent conduct," thereby triggering potential coverage under
the policy. Id. at 177. There seems to be no principled basis for distinguishing between
the possibility that a plaintiff might amend a civil claim in light of the insured's antici
pated defense and the possibility that a plaintiff might withdraw a civil claim and refile
it as a claim for workers' compensation benefits in light of the employer's defense to the
claim. More importantly, if the employer's claim is in fact subject to the exclusive juris
diction of the workers' compensation system, it appears only reasonable for an em
ployer to expect its insurance carrier to secure a dismissal of the improperly filed civil
action (or certain counts in the complaint) and to protect the employer's interests in the
worker's compensation forum with respect to such claims. For this reason, La Jolla is
perhaps best read as a decision by the court that it will not mandate litigation coverage
. when to do so would place enormous strains on the already overburdened workers'
compensation system.
.
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cause more harm than good. Despite this apparent resolution,
there most certainly will be additional litigation in California re
garding an employer's ability to secure a defense from its liability
carriers for employment litigation, especially since the La lolla
court was careful to limit its analysis to the duty to defend under
the workers' compensation portion of the policy and was also care
ful ~ot to decide the scope of the duty to defend under the em
ployer's liability portion of the policy.81
The doctrine of reasonable expectations is vitally important to
employers seeking coverage for employment litigation, since a
painstaking review of the specific language of many liability policies
will suggest that coverage is not afforded for many liabilities arising
out of employment-related practices. However, it would be a mis
take to conclude that courts will lightly disregard policy terms, and
so it is important for the employment lawyer to determine which
application of the reasonable expectations doctrine fits with the
facts of the case, thereby serving her client's needs, and to assist the
client in developing a strategy for invoking the doctrine
persuasively.
B.

Public Policy as a Limitation on Promised Coverage
It is well established that courts will not enforce contracts that

are contrary to public policy, regardless of the clarity with which the
parties have expressed their intentions to be bound.82 Insurance
contracts are subject to this general rule no less than other con
tracts.83 This limitation on the parties' freedom to contract is pre
mised on the fact that a contract is never entirely a private matter,
especially if the contract is a liability insurance policy. By defini
tion, a contract of liability insurance affects the injured third party
seeking compensation from the insured by providing a source of
funds to satisfy a judgment. Obviously, there is a strong public pol
icy in favor of ensuring that injured parties are compensated to the
fullest extent possible. The contract might also affect other persons,
however, if the existence of insurance encourages the insured to
81. La Jolla, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 103, 884 P.2d at 1048. If Gray remains good law,
these arguments should prove persuasive, since the result in La Jolla is premised on the
forum in which the complaint was filed. Liability policies other than the workers' com
pensation policy, of course, provide coverage for damages awarded in civil suits within
the terms of the policy.
82. RESTATEMENT (SECONO) OF CoNTRACTS § 178 (1979); E. ALLEN FARNS·
WORTIi, CoNTRACTS §§ 5.1-5.9 (2d ed. 1990).
83. CoUCH ON INSURANCE 20 (rev. ed.) § 39:14 (Mark S. Rhodes, ed. 1985).
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harm others intentionally by absolving the insured of financial ac
countability.84 It is equally obvious that there is a strong public pol
icy in favor of reducing injurious behavior and requiring that
certain wrongdoers bear the full consequences of their actions.
The public policy defense, when used as a limitation on prom
ised coverage in an insurance policy, amounts to a decision that the
former public policy is outweighed by the latter on the facts of a
particular case. Thus, courts deem certain claims to be uninsurable,
despite the fact that this has the undesirable effect of eliminating a
source of funds to satisfy any judgment obtained by an injured third
party claimant. The general rule in this regard, known as the princi
ple of "fortuity," is that "a contract of insurance to indemnify a
person for damages resulting from his own intentional misconduCt
is void as against public policy and courts will not enforce such a
contract."85 If courts "make insurance" with the doctrine of reason
able expectations, then they also "unmake insurance" with the pub
lic policy limitation on enforcement.
One of the earliest and most important developments in mod
em employment law was judicial recognition of the tort of wrongful
discharge in violation of public policy.86 As stated in a leading case,
"when an employer's discharge of an employee violates fundamen
tal principles of public policy, the discharged employee may main
tain a tort action and recover damages traditionally available in
such actions."87 One might expect courts to prohibit an employer
from enforcing any insurance coverage available for a wrongful dis
charge claim, given that the underlying liability necessarily impli
cates public policy. In Dixon Distribution Co. v. Hanover Insurance
Co. ,88 the lllinois courts recently addressed this issue in a manner
that clarifies the public policy defense to enforcement of insurance
contracts and distinguishes this defense from the use of public pol
84. Ranger Ins. Co. v. Bal Harbour Club Inc., 549 So. 2d 1005, 1007 (Fla. 1989)
("The rationale underlying [the public policy doctrine] is that the availability of insur
ance will directly stimulate the intentional wrongdoer to violate the law."). Based upon
this rationale, for example, courts will not permit a party to insure against liabilities it
incurs by engaging in criminal conduct. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v.
Baer, 745 F. Supp. 595 (N.D. Cal. 1990), affd, 956 F.2d 275 (9th Cir. 1992).
85. Dixon Distrib. Co. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 641 N.E.2d 395, 401 (III. 1994). This
public policy doctrine may be judicially acknowledged, or in some cases it is directly
stated in legislation. See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 533 (West 1993) and MASS. GEN. L. ch.
175, § 47 (1994).
86. MARK A. ROTHSTEIN, ET. AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW §§ 9.9-9.14 (1994).
87. Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 840, 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal.
1980).
88. 612 N.E.2d 846 (III. App. Ct. 1993), affd, 641 N.E.2d 395 (III. 1994).
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icy as the gravamen of an employment tort. As explained in Dixon,
although in some instances termination of employment will contra
vene public policy, it is not necessarily the case that permitting the
employer to utilize available insurance coverage will also violate
public policy.
In Dixon, the employer had been sued for willfully, intention
ally, and wrongfully terminating an employee in retaliation for hav
ing filed two workers' compensation claims. These allegations state
a classic case of wrongful discharge, since public policy strongly dis
favors permitting employers to use their economic power to inhibit
employees from exercising their statutory rights. The trial court de
termined that coverage for wrongful termination suits is precluded
in the interests of public policy. Nevertheless, the appellate court
reversed the summary judgment entered in favor of the insurer,
holding that the tort claim fell within the coverage provision of the
policy and that public policy did not bar enforcement of the insur
ance contract. 89 The appellate court reasoned that the availability
of insurance coverage for wrongful discharge claims would benefit
all parties and would not induce wrongful behavior.
It may be more in the public's interest to allow businesses to pro
tect themselves by insurance coverage against all the various
forms of claims for discrimination, sexual harassment, and retali
atory discharge than to allow businesses to become bankrupt in
defending against several catastrophic suits.
If insurance coverage somehow insulated employers from li
ability and thereby made them more likely to fire employees in
retaliation for asserting protected rights, then the public policy
may favor a restriction of insurance on that basis. However ...
[i]nsurance companies have the right to refuse to insure or to in
crease their premiums, both of which may act as deterrents
against retaliatory discharges by impetuous employers.

89. The appellate court held that the tort of wrongful discharge was within the
policy definition of "occurrence" because it did not necessarily involve an act commit
ted with "actual malice." Dixon, 612 N.E.2d at 853 (contending that terminations in
violation of public policy may be premised on business decisions rather than animus).
The supreme court affirmed, noting that the tort of wrongful discharge required only a
causal connection between the worker's compensation filings and the discharge, not
actual malice against the employee. Dixon, 641 N.E.2d at 399. Moreover, the court
noted that although punitive damages are available as a remedy in a suit for wrongful
discharge upon a showing of actual malice, punitive damages are not a "necessary con
sequence of the tort." Id. at 400.
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Having a third party, with an economic interest to protect,
oversee the actions of the employer could be very beneficial to
the employee and society.90
The supreme court reinforced this balancing test by emphasizing
that public policy is implicated only when an employer seeks in
demnification for injuries that it intended to inflict, and not when
an employer seeks coverage for intentional actions that have re
sulted in injuries. 91
The analysis in Dixon is persuasive, and should provide gui
dance to other courts. The public policy against enforcing insur
ance contracts should be triggered only when an insurance policy
will indemnify an employer who intended to harm its employees
with impunity in light of available coverage. Otherwise, the public
policy in favor of making resources available to injured persons
supports enforcement of coverage. In contrast, the tort of wrongful
discharge is premised on the bare intentional action of discharging
an employee, under circumstances where the public interest is
harmed as a result of this action. There appears to be no sound
reason to preclude the insurability of wrongful discharge claims per
se, although certain wrongful discharge claims may involve the kind
of intentional behavior that, if not outside the policy coverage,
would be deemed uninsurable for reasons of public policy.92
The circumstances under which courts will void coverage on
the grounds of public policy have been carefully considered in a
90.
91.

Dixon, 612 N.E.2d at 857.
Dixon, 641 N.E.2d at 401-02. This distinction is expressed in Lumbermens

Mut. Casualty Co. v. S-W Indus., Inc" 39 F.3d 1324, 1331 (6th CiT. 1994), where the
court interpreted the policy language defining a covered occurrence as being neither
"expected nor intended" as preserving "the element of 'fortuity'" by preventing in
sureds from using liability coverage as a shield for the consequences of their' anticipated
intentional conduct. The court distinguished this narrow limit on coverage from the
"broader range of losses" constituting intentional torts and held that the employer's
insurer must indemnify the employer for compensatory damages paid to an employee
after suffering a jury verdict for an intentional tort.
92. But see Coit Drapery Cleaners, Inc. v. Sequoia Ins. Co., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 692,
698 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (interpreting a legislatively enunciated public policy against
insuring willful acts to "bar the attempt to shift liability for intentional sexual harass
ment and associated employment-related torts [claims of wrongful discharge, infliction
of emotional distress, battery, and sexual assault] to an insurer"). However, Coit pri
marily was a sexual harassment case involving particularly egregious behavior by the
defendant and therefore probably should not be read as necessarily precluding cover
age for all wrongful discharge claims. Cf U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Beltmann North Am.
CO.,883 F.2d 564, 568-69 (7th Cir. 1989) (applying lIIinois law and holding that wrong
ful discharge allegations will necessarily fall within the "actual malice" policy exclusion;
subsequently disapproved in Dixon, 641 N.E.2d at 400).
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number of cases involving discriminatory employment practices. In
these cases the same dynamic is at work: on one hand courts are
reluctant to leave third party plaintiffs without recourse to funds
contractually owed the defendant employer, but on the other hand
courts are hesitant to permit an employer to purchase insurance
against prospective liability for discriminating against employees
and applicants for employment. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, which prohibits employment discrimination, is similar to the
tort of wrongful discharge in that liability may exist even in the ab
sence of a specific intent to cause harm. 93 In such cases of "dispa
rate impact" discrimination, courts generally find that the existence
of liability insurance does not undermine public policy.94
In contrast, a claim by an employee that she has suffered "dis
parate treatment" on discriminatory grounds necessarily includes
an allegation that the employer intended to discriminate. 95 Some
courts have concluded that insurance coverage for intentional dis
crimination would undermine the strong public policy against dis
crimination. 96 However, this position has been challenged by other
93. TItle VII is codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e-2000h(6) (1988 & Supp. 1993).
In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), the United States Supreme Court
held that TItle VII was directed against discriminatory effects in the workplace as well
as intentionally discriminatory actions by employers. In the lexicon of discrimination
law, the former cases involve "disparate impact," whereas "disparate treatment" is in
volved in the latter cases.
94. See, e.g., Solo Cup Co. v. Federal Ins. Co., 619 F.2d 1178, 1187-88 (7th Cir.),
cen. denied, 449 U.S. 1033 (1980);Save Mart Supermarkets v. Underwriters at Lloyd's
London, 843 F. Supp. 597, 606 (N.D. Cal. 1994); Union Camp Corp. v. Continental
Casualty Co., 452 F. Supp. 565, 568 (S.D. Ga. 1978).
95. When claiming "disparate treatment," the employee has an affirmative bur
den of production and the ultimate burden of proof regarding the employer's discrimi
natory intent. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
96. See, e.g., Foxon Packaging Corp. v. Aetna Casualty and Sur. Co., 905 F. Supp.
1139 (1995). After holding that the racial discrimination charge was excluded from
coverage, the court continued by declaring (in dicta) that insurance coverage for inten
tional discrimination is void as against public policy.
Aetna argues, and this court agrees, that the public policy of the State of
Rhode Island as articulated in the Fair Labor Practices Act, militates against
judicial creation of a safe harbor within which Foxon may presumably violate
the law at will with impunity. Such a result would do violence to the public
policy of the state and eviscerate the statute's intended guarantee of a work
place free of discrimination.
Foxon comes before this court to seek, in essence, insulation from its own
wrongdoing ... It would be a clear violation of public policy if businesses and
individuals could insure themselves against liability for committing intentional
acts of discrimination. This result would promote, rather than deter discrimi
natory behavior .... Foxon's knowing failure to address the blatantly discrim
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courts that enforce coverage even for intentional "disparate treat
ment" of employees, finding such coverage not to be contrary to
public policy.97 The different results in these cases are not ex
ina tory acts of its employees should not be condoned by shifting the burden of
satisfying Hernandez's damage awards to Aetna.
Id. at 1146.
See also Coit, 18 Cal. Rptr, 2d 692 (interpreting state statute precluding insurance
for willful acts with regard to a case involving egregious, predatory, and intentional
sexual harassment and discrimination); Boston Hous. Auth. v. Atlanta Int'l Ins. Co., 781
F. Supp. 80, 83 (D. Mass. 1992) (interpreting state statute precluding insurance for de
liberate or intentional wrongdoing to preclude coverage in light allegations that the
insured flagrantly and deliberately violated anti-discrimination provisions and govern
ment orders); Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 23 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. 778 (D.D.C. 1980) (BNA); Continental Ins. Co. v. McDaniel, 772 P.2d
6,9 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988) (concluding that "there is no coverage for an insured's inten
tional acts, wrongful under the law of torts, because contractual intent and public policy
coincide to prevent an insured from acting wrongfully knowing his insurance company
will pay the damages"); Ranger Ins. Co. v. Bal Harbour Club, Inc., 549 So. 2d 1005,
1009 (Fla. 1989) (holding that permitting parties to insure against claims of intentional
religious discrimination would encourage such discrimination).
97. See, e.g., Union Camp, 452 F. Supp. at 567-68 (S.D. Ga. 1978) ("The proposi
tion that insurance taken out by an employer to protect against liability under TItle VII
will encourage violations of the Act is based on an assumption that is speculative and
erroneous.... Where a class of employees is entitled to back pay under a court order
and the employer is financially unable to comply with the same, insurance would pro
vide the mandated compensation." The court noted that the insurer remains free to
exclude such liabilities from coverage.); Clark-Peterson Co. v. Independent Ins. As
socs., 492 N.W.2d 675 (Iowa 1992) (utilizing the doctrine of reasonable expectations to
extend coverage beyond the precise terms of the policy).
These cases often involve variations of D&O or E&O policies written for public
school districts. These products insure against liabilities arising out of "wrongful acts"
and generally do not exclude intentional wrongs. In fact, the very purpose of these
policies is to protect an entity, usually a public school, from the substantial losses that it
may incur vicariously and also for defending and indemnifying its employees for their
wrongful acts, whether committed intentionally or negligently. Consequently, insurers
must rely on public policy arguments in an effort to avoid coverage. See, e.g. School
Dist. for the City of Royal Oak v. Continental Casualty Co., 912 F.2d 844, 847-50 (6th
Cir. 1990); New Madrid County Reorg. Sch. Dist. No.1 v. Continental Casualty Co.,
904 F.2d 1236 (8th Cir. 1990); University of Ill. v. Continental Casualty Co., 599 N.E.2d
1338, 1351 (Ill. Ct. App. 1992), appeal denied 606 N.E.2d 1235 (Ill. 1992) ("[W]e find
there is no Illinois public policy prohibiting insuring for damages caused by one's inten
tional acts except to the extent that the insured wrongdoer may not be the person who
recovers the policy proceeds. The fact that many insurance policies contain an exclu
sion for intentional conduct demonstrates insurers have not relied on any broad public
policy. Defendant could have included such an exclusion in its BEL policy, but did not.
This court will not rewrite the BEL policy to create an exclusion."); Independent Sch.
Dist. No. 697, Eveleth v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 515 N.W.2d 576,580 (Minn.
1994) ("We do not believe that a school district will discriminate against its employees
simply because it carries wrongful act insurance coverage; nor do we believe that school
districts carrying this type of insurance coverage have a license to commit intentional
wrongs. Accordingly, we enforce the contract as it is written."); Cf Continental Casu
alty Co. v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 924 F.2d 370 (1st Cir. 1991) (finding that cover
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plained by the use of different tests but rather in the application of
an agreed balancing test: weighing the benefit to the plaintiff of per
mitting insurance coverage against the harm to society of encourag
ing future intentional wrongdoing.98 Courts permitting coverage
reject the hypothesis that discrimination will be reduced by denying
coverage.
In short, then, public policy does not prohibit an employer
sued for discrimination or wrongful discharge from ever obtaining a
defense and indemnification under liability insurance. In fact, re
cent court decisions evidence a willingness to permit insurance cov
erage even for intentional acts by the employer. However, if the
wrongful act amounts to a purposeful effort by the employer to
cause injury to the employee, courts generally still will refuse to
enforce otherwise available insurance for reasons of public policy.
In such cases, though, it often is the case that the insurance policy
will preclude coverage in unambiguous terms in either the insuring
agreement or the exclusions, and so the public policy doctrine
age for sexual harassment is unambiguous under the "wrongful acts" trigger and
offering no discussion of any potential public policy bar to enforcement).
The Royal Oak court cited an article by Professor Willborn with approval, conclud
ing that the presumption that liability insurance might "stimulate" future discriminatory
conduct is unfounded. See Steven L. Willborn, Insurance, Public Policy, and Employ
ment Discrimination, 66 MINN. L. REv. 1003 (1982). Professor Willborn argues that
insurance coverage generally should be enforced to effectuate the public policy favoring
compensation unless the insured displays a "calculating intent" to engage in discrimina
tion based on the existence of insurance. Id. at 1027-30.
Of course, if the policy limits coverage to negligent acts, then "disparate treat
ment" discrimination will fall outside the coverage even if public policy would permit
coverage. See, e.g., Golf Course Super. Ass'n of Am. v. Underwriters at Lloyd's,
London, 761 F. Supp. 1485, 1491 (D. Kan. 1991) (no coverage under policy language,
although Kansas law permits coverage even for punitive damages awarded as a result of
intentional acts for which the insured is vicariously liable); School Dist. No.1 v. Mission
Ins. Co., 650 P.2d 929 (Or. Q. App. 1982). Similarly, when the plaintiff is suing only for
bodily injuries, then an educational liability policy (which excludes such injuries from
coverage) will not be triggered, although coverage under the insured's CGL policy may
well be triggered. Wayne Township Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs v. Indiana Ins. Co., 650
N.E.2d 1205, 1211·12 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (holding CGL coverage was triggered, but
not coverage under an Educational Errors and Omissions Policy in a suit for injuries
caused when a school principal sexually molested a student).
98. Thus, in Ranger the court explicitly found that anti-discrimination legislation
primarily is intended to deter wrongdoing rather than compensate victims, thereby tilt
ing the balance toward prohibiting coverage. Ranger, 549 So. 2d at 1006-09. In con
trast, in Royal Oak the court rejected the idea that insurance coverage would promote
discriminatory practices, finding that "the prospect of escalating insurance costs and the
trauma of litigation, to say nothing of the risk of uninsurable punitive damages, would
normally neutralize any stimulative tendency the insurance might have"; thus, the court
found little to counterbalance the public interest in providing a source of funds to the
injured plaintiff. Royal Oak, 912 F.2d at 848.
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should only rarely place an additional limitation on the scope of
coverage. 99
99. In most cases, the intentional nature of the conduct will remove the case from
coverage under the terms of the policy, and so the public policy issue need not be
reached. See, e.g., American Guar. and Liability Ins. Co. v. Vista Medical Supply, 699
F. Supp. 787, 789-90 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (holding that California law permits insurance
coverage unless there is a "preconceived design to inflict injury," but that the policy
restricts coverage of intentional act to a much greater degree); Intermountain Gas Co.
v. Industrial Indem. Co., 868 P.2d 510, 515 (Idaho Ct. App. 1994) (holding that inten
tional discrimination is excluded under the policy); Daly Ditches Irrigation Dist. v. Na
tional Sur. Corp., 764 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Mont. 1988).
A recent Massachusetts case underscores the importance of policy exclusions in
this regard. Shortly after being ordered to pay claimants who alleged "disparate treat
ment" sex discrimination, the employer ceased operations. The claimants brought a
direct action against the employer's CGL carrier to recover their judgment, but sum
mary judgment was entered for the insurer on the ground that the policy excluded cov
erage for intentional acts. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed on this
ground, not reaching the question whether coverage would be precluded under the stat
utorily defined public policy against insuring intentional harm. Rideout v. Crum & For
ster Commercial Ins., 633 N.E.2d 376 (Mass. 1994). It is conceivable that the public
policy balancing under these particular facts, involving injured claimants with no other
means to satisfy the judgment and a now defunct employer, might not void coverage
had it been available. Although the existence of a statute defining the public policy of
Massachusetts might be deemed to afford less leeway to courts, there still is room for
judicial interpretation of what a finding of "willfulness" means as a matter of substan
tive employment law. See, e.g., Andover Newton Technological Sch., Inc. v. Continen
tal Casualty Co., 930 F.2d 89, 93 (1st Cir. 1991) (finding that coverage for a "willful"
violation of federal age discrimination law is not subject to the statutory bar, since "will
fulness" includes the "reckless disregard" of whether the conduct is prohibited). More
over, even if the statute is deemed to preclude indemnification, it may not preclude
enforcement of the insurer's duty to defend. Id. at 95. See also Republic Indem. Co. v.
Superior Court, 273 Cal. Rptr. 331, 334 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (interpreting CAL. INS.
CODE §533 (West 1994». But see Boston Housing Authority, 781 F. Supp. at 83-84. Cf
Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Barbara B., 846 P.2d 792 (Cal. 1993) (statutory bar applies
only to indemnification for the intentional conduct, and not to the duty to defend in a
case that may involve some non-intentional acts giving rise to liability).
A similar issue arises when an insured seeks indemnification for the punitive dam
ages component of an otherwise covered loss. There has been a great deal of litigation
regarding the insurability of punitive damages.
The debate is a vigorous one. Not surprisingly, courts are split on the question
of whether punitive damages liability for reckless, wanton, or grossly negligent
conduct is uninsurable. Roughly two-thirds of the states that have considered
the question have held that punitive damages are insurable, and the remaining
states have held that punitive damages are not insurable. Where punitive
damages are insurable, however, all states that have considered the matter
recognize an exception when the insured's conduct is intentional.
JERRY, supra note 29, at 352. See also Alan I. Widiss, Liability Insurance Coverage for
Punitive Damages? Discerning Answers to the Conundrum Created by Disputes Involv
ing Conflicting Public Policies, Pragmatic Considerations and Political Actions, 39 VILL.
L. REv. 455, 493 (1994) (surveying the current state of the law and arguing that punitive
damages ought to be insurable in many instances) and George L. Priest, Insurability
and Punitive Damages, 40 ALA. L. REV. 1009 (1989) ("Our courts conflict sharply: some
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CONCLUSION

Employment lawyers acting as defense counsel have grown
weary of the willingness of courts in recent years to develop flexible
common law responses to employee claims. However, this same
judicial attitude works to the benefit of employers when they de
mand a defense and seek indemnification under a liability insurance
policy for employment-related claims. In both situations, the con
temporary approach is to place less emphasis on the technical word
ing of adhesion documents connected with the relationship in favor
of upholding reasonable expectations.1 0o For the employer seeking
insurance coverage of an employment-related claim, the maxim
deny coverage on grounds of public policy; the majority allow coverage."). As Profes
sor Priest notes, the increasing willingness to permit coverage of punitive damages is
directly related to the substantial expansion of the availability of the remedy, to the
extent that the traditional "requisite level of moral depravity to justify punitive liabil
ity" that raises the public policy question in the first place may be lacking. Id. at 1034.
Given the availability of punitive damages for many employment related claims,
this question is of significant concern for employers and insurers. See, e.g., Lumber
mens Mut. Casualty Co. v. S-W Indus., Inc., 39 F.3d 1324, 1329 (6th Cir. 1994), which
held that an employer was not entitled to indemnification for a $2.5 million punitive
damage award, although the employer was entitled to indemnification for compensa
tory damages incurred as a result of an intentional tort. The Lumbermens court noted
that, because punitive damages are designed to punish and deter, public policy weighs
much more heavily against insurability than it does with respect to compensatory dam
ages for intentional torts. Cf Wojciak v. Northern Package Corp., 310 N.W.2d 675, 680
(Minn. 1981) (permitting employer to recover discretionary treble damages under stat
ute prohibiting retaliatory discharge, since "the statute reflects as much concern for the
employees' welfare as it does a desire to punish employers," in contrast to common law
punitive damages).
100. Despite this parallel at a very general level, however, it would be a mistake
to conclude that substantive developments in employment law will translate directly to
substantive changes in the interpretation of insurance policies. Employers will be sub
jected to new forms of liability that are held not to be within the scope of their liability
coverage, despite the (reasonable?) expectation that their liability policies would cover
such unanticipated exposure. See, e.g., SL Indus., Inc. v. American Motorists Ins. Co.,
607 A.2d 1266, 1275 (N.J. 1992), which stated:
Now that tort law has expanded to recognize claims for emotional distress,
both with and without physical manifestations, the argument is that an insured
would reasonably expect coverage to be extended to those suits. We disagree.
Tort law and insurance law are not coextensive.... Regardless of changes in
tort law, an insured does not reasonably expect the policy to be interpreted in
ways that contravene the contract's language.
Id.
On the other hand, employers have not been held to the same remedial standards
as insurers for breaches of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, just one example
of the fact that their exposure to their employees is in some important respects more
narrow than their insurer's exposure to them. See Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765
P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988) (distinguishing employers and insurers, holding that only insurers
are subject to tort damages for a bad faith breach).
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contra proferentem and the doctrine of reasonable expectations
work to transform insurance policies into valuable economic re
sources for managing the employer's exposure and losses.
The flexibility evidenced in the court decisions is not unprinci
pled, however. As in the employment context, at some point the
courts respect the ability of insurers to define the scope of the risks
that they are assuming. Insurers are most likely to be able to en
force limitations on coverage for employment litigation if: (1) they
limit their risks plainly and clearly and in accordance with the pol
icy premiums being charged and (2) the limitations are either con
sistent with the employer's reasonable expectations or are
marketed in a manner designed to eliminate such expectations. 101
The recent efforts by insurers to amend their policies to exclude
coverage for liability related to employment practices, if they prove
successful in the market, likely will continue to pass judicial muster.
If so, in many cases employers may be precluded from asserting
potential coverage under the policy and thereby triggering the in
surer's duty to defend. The law governing employment relations
continues to change daily, though, and so the battles between em
ployers and their insurers are far from over.
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